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The Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) requires that Government 
contractors provide cost or pricing data for procurements equal to or 
exceeding $500,000 and certify that such data are accurate, current 
and complete upon agreement of a contract's price. However, 
preparation, provision and examination of these data are tedious, 
time-consuming and costly for the contractor and the Government. The 
objective of this research was to determine how Department of Defense' 
experience with TINA Waivers could be used to improve Naval Aviation 
acquisi tion processes. The thesis examines acquisi tions made by 
three aviation procurement organizations using these waivers. The 
methodology included gathering waiver-related information to assess 
the overall use, policy and guidance, methodologies, effects and the 
opinions related to waivers. The findings illustrate that waivers 
can offer considerable benefits of time and cost savings. However, 
barriers exist precluding them from regular use. These include 
approval limitations, a lack of waiver guidance and a limited 
diversity of waiver use. From these findings, reccmnendations are 
made to remove restrictive waiver policies and procedures, reduce the 
level of approval authority for waivers, increase waiver guidance and 
approve blanket or class waivers. 
v 
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During the past several years, the Department of 
Defense (DOD) has begun to transition from using a rigid, 
cumbersome acquisition framework to one that is allowing 
more flexibility and individual initiative. A decreased 
defense budget, tough industry scrutiny on methods of 
Government contracting and a realization of the benefits 
inherent in commercial type practices are some of the 
driving forces for this change. The watchword of the day is 
"Acquisition Reform". 
With reform comes the necessity for acquisition 
personnel to change their methods, methodology and tools for 
conducting procurements. Current policy and guidance no 
longer reflect exacting steps for formulating a one-size-
fits-all purchase. Instead, they provide limits and 
alternatives that may be used to guide the acquisition 
professional down myriad paths of success. One reform 
initiative is the expanded use of waivers in place of costly 
and time-consuming administrative contracting processes. 
This study examines the use of waivers to the Truth in 
1 
Negotiations Act (TINA) in regard to the requirement for 
providing certified cost or pricing data. 
TINA requires certified cost or pricing data for 
certain Government procurements equal to, or in excess of, 
$500,000. Under certain conditions, contracting officers 
and program managers may obtain waivers to this requirement. 
TINA Waivers can provide considerable benefits in the form 
of both cost and timesaving. Proponents and users of TINA 
Waivers have demonstrated savings in the millions of dollars 
in administrative costs and reductions in contract cycle 
times of up to 75 percent. [Ref. 20:p. 51-52] Improvements 
of this magnitude dramatically increase the capabilities and 
flexibility of the acquisition workforce to conduct 
streamlined procurements. The dilemma that exists is that 
TINA Waivers do not appear to be used in all procurement 
scenarios where a potential for use exists. Instead, waiver 
use appears to be stunted by a lack of knowledge concerning 
its existence and/or 'a fear of the risk involved with its 
use. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTJ:VES 
The objective of this research is to determine how the 
DOD's experience with TINA waivers may be used to improve 
Naval Aircraft procurement practices. It is apparent 
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through a precursory examination of several major defense 
systems acquisitions that TINA Waivers can provide abundant 
cost and timesaving. In light of this, the researcher looks 
at the application of waivers throughout the Services, the 
opinions of Government and civilian acquisition personnel 
and the resident policies in the DOD and DON in regard to 
waivers. An analysis of these areas is used to draw 
conclusions on what lend themselves to be the best practices 
for waiver application and mitigating associated waiver 
risk. These conclusions serve as the foundation for 
offering objective recommendations for improving the use of 
TINA Waivers within the DON's aircraft procurement sector. 
The thesis will then attempt to generalize this knowledge to 
aviation programs and other procurements in Services DOD 
wide. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The thesis research addresses the following research 
questions. 
1. PRIMARY 
How can Department of Defense experience with TINA 
Waivers be used to improve Naval Aviation acquisition 
processes? 
3 
2 • SECONDARY 
a) What events precipitated the passage of the TINA 
and what was Congress's intent in passing the law? 
b) What are the major DOD and Department of the Navy 
(DON) policies with respect to TINA Cost or 
Pricing Certifications and Waivers? 
c) What are the advantages and 




d) What are the benefits and risks associated with 
TINA Waivers? 
e) How have TINA Certification and Waiver processes 
changed since the passage of the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994? 
f) What is DOD's experience with TINA Waivers prior 
to and subsequent to the passage of FASA and, 
specifically, has FA SA had any impact on the 
number of TINA Waivers sought by Naval Aviation 
Programs? 
g) What are the current incentives and barriers that 
promote/hinder the use of TINA Waivers? 
h) What actions might a Program Manager or a 
Contracting Officer take to eliminate, reduce or 
mitigate the risks associated with TINA Waivers? 
i) How might the use of TINA Waivers be 





j) How can this knowledge be generalized to non-
aviation programs in the Navy and other 
procurements in DOD Services? 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of the thesis is limited to an analysis of 
the use of TINA Waivers within the Naval Aviation 
procurement process. Specifically, implementation of TINA 
Waivers are examined in the Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIRSYSCOM) and its tenant program offices. Insight is 
offered into the extent to which TINA Waivers are being used 
in this activity, the cost and time savings associated with 
their use and whether potential exists for increased use. 
The following is reviewed and analyzed in conducting this 
study: 
• Current policy, guidance and professional literature 
relating to the waiver process. 
• Opinion and insight provided by acquisition 
workforce personnel at different tiers within the 
NAVAIRSYSCOM. 
• Information and wisdom provided by civilian 
aerospace contractors. 
• Data provided by military and civilian contract 
entities involved in the aircraft procurement 
process. 
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E. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This study is limited by the fact that there is minimal 
data formally recorded on the cost and time savings 
associated with TINA Waivers within NAVAIRSYSCOM. Savings 
for this study are computed based mainly on other data 
recorded by NAVAIRSYSCOM that lend themselves to 
extrapolation and information provided by cognizant 
NAVAIRSYSCOM staff. 
This thesis is written with the assumptions that: 
• NAVAIRSYSCOM has a need for information regarding 
the savings applicable to their use of TINA Waivers. 
• There is room for expanding the use of TINA Waivers 
within the Naval Aviation procurement process. 
• Program Managers and Contracting Officers possess a 
need for guidance that will assist them in 
mitigating the risks of utilizing TINA Waivers. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
Analysis of this study is conducted by reviewing data 
and information obtained from: 
• NAVAIRSYSCOM and its tenant program offices. 
• Select civilian aerospace contractors. 
• Current DOD and DON policy and guidance. 
• Professional literature. 
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The datal information obtained are gathered in the form of 
personal and phone interviews, and surveys, with DOD and 
civilian contracting personnel, qualitative and quantitative 
contractual documents provided by NAVAIRSYSCOM, the United 
States Army and Air Force's procurement conunands and the 
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). Reports compiled by 
the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) 
and literature resident at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(Knox) Library, Systems Management Acquisition Library and 
other DOD and civilian libraries was also used. Using this 
information, comparisons are made between traditional 
contracting methods without waivers and procurements that 
have utilized the waiver process. From these comparisons, 
attempts are made to quantify the spectrum of time and cost 
savings afforded by TINA Waivers, identify inherent risks 
with waiver use and highlight potential policy shortfalls. 
This information is then used as the basis for 
reconunendations that 'are made relating to TINA Waivers. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II discusses a historical overview perspective 
of the Truth in Negotiations Act. Specifically, what the 
contracting practices were prior to TINA, what events 
7 
precipitated the TINA and what TINA now requires in the form 
of cost or pricing certifications. 
Chapter III lays out the effects of Acquisition Reform. 
This chapter discusses the elemental general trends in the 
Acquisi tion Reform process, the specifics of the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 and the associated 
changes made to current DOD/DON policies. 
Chapter IV presents data relevant to the use of TINA 
Waivers within the DOD with a focus on Naval Aviation 
programs. Data are presented on the extent of TINA Waiver 
use amongst three aviation procurement commands, current 
TINA Waiver policy documentation, the methodologies being 
used for processing waivers, the effects waivers have and 
the opinions of the acquisition workforce relating to 
waivers and their implementation. Each segment of data 
presentation is followed by the researcher's analysis of the 
data. 
Chapter VI summarizes the researcher's intent of the 
thesis and makes conclusions based on data gathered by the 
researcher. Additionally, it offers the researcher's 
recommendations on furthering TINA Waiver use based on the 
findings of prior chapters. 
further research. 
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Lastly, it presents areas for 
II. THE TINA EVOLUTION 
A. :INTRODUCT:ION 
The nature of Government contracting is unique compared 
to that of large commercial business. A host of special 
rules, regulations and policies, as well as the enormity and· 
variance of its purchases, characterizes it. Its design is 
influenced by a number of goals. One of the more 
predominant of these is the procurement of goods and 
Services with the best interest of the American people in 
mind. Like any system, it requires continual enhancement 
and updating to preserve its ability to best meet this goal. 
Numerous changes seeking to maintain this effort over the 
last thirty plus years mark Government procurement. This 
chapter discusses the details of one such change, the Truth 
in Negotiations Act of 1962, and attempts to familiarize the 
reader with the specifics of TINA's mandate for cost and 
pricing data certifications. 
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B. A HiSTORiCAL PERSPECTiVE PRiOR TO TiNA 
1. Formal Advertising Procurement 
Prior to the Truth in Negotiations Act and as far back 
as 1861, formal advertising was the mandatory method of 
Government contracting. In fact, the first statute that 
included clear provisions for formal advertising was the 
Civil Sundry Appropriations Act passed in 1861. [Ref. 23:p. 
239] The sealed bidding process (or formal advertising), 
then and today, involves time consuming administrative 
actions including: 
• A written solicitation for bids inclusive of all 
pertinent information needed by an offeror to 
prepare a bid. 
• Advertisement of the solicitation to all eligible 
sources of supply. 
• A forum for public bid openings that are announced 
in the solicitation. 
• Award to the bidder whose proposal is most favorable 
to the Government. 
Sealed bidding served as the mandatory method of 
contracting from 1861 until 1984. Although a sound 
procurement method, the process was burdensome and 
inefficient during periods of past national conflict. 
During these times, contracting actions required streamlined 
10 
approaches that allowed procurement in an expeditious 
fashion. 
The need to acquire ammunition and supplies 
quickly to support the war effort precipitated a 
need to alter the Federal Procurement policy of 
open competition, low bid wins, to one that 
limited competition to those offerors capable of 
meeting stringent delivery schedules even though 
they were not the low offerors. [Ref. 12:p. 1-1] 
Because of this need, the mandate for sealed bidding 
was often waived, allowing negotiated procurements to foster 
aid in the acquisition effort. Maj or examples of these 
allowances were embodied in the War Powers Act of 1941, the 
Armed Services Procurement Act (ASPA) of 1947 and Federal 
Property and Administrative Services Act (FPASA) of 1949. 
The later of the two required sealed bidding as the primary 
means of contracting but allowed negotiated procurements 
under a series of exceptions. [Ref 23:p. 239-240] 
2. Negotiated Procurements; Pre 1962 
Major differences exist between the negotiated 
procurement process used prior to TINA and that used widely 
today. Unlike current practices where discussions are held 
with all offerors in a competitive range, negotiations in 
the past consisted of a unilateral decision making process. 
11 
During this period, proposals received in response 
to a solicitation were evaluated in one step for 
both source selection and negotiation purposes; 
the source selection decision would be made on the 
basis of an internal evaluation prior to the 
initiation of negotiation. [Ref. 23:p. 268] 
Conducting procurements in this fashion resulted in 
contractors being selected without affording consideration 
to all applicable procurement factors. Furthermore, it 
permitted the exclusion of offerors, other than those-
selected as contract awardees, from negotiation discussions. 
In general, the entire process was void of regulatory 
guidance and structure. As a result, it facilitated a quick 
means of getting items on contract but left the Government 
in a relegated position. Offerors were slighted in that 
they were not given the opportunity to amend their proposals 
within the scope of the solicitation and offer the 
Government a better procurement. This totally excluded the 
concept of best and final offers. As a result, the 
negotiation process served no benefit other than to furnish 
the Government with clarification on the things that could 
be provided by a selected offeror. [Ref. 23:p. 268] 
By 1951, the use of negotiated procurements was on the 
rise as a result of the Korean Conflict. With an increase 
in such, the u.s. Congress soon implemented what could be 
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considered a monumental step in protecting the interests of 
the sovereign. 
It provided that all negotiated contracts should 
include a clause giving the Comptroller General 
access to any directly pertinent books and records 
of the contractor or any subcontractors engaged in 
the performance of such contracts or subcontracts. 
[Ref. 14:p. 1] 
This change was effected in a modification to the Armed 
Services Procurement Act of 1951 and set the stage for a 
precipitation of events that eventually led to the TINA. 
Subsequent to this change, negotiated procurements 
continued escalating in number, while the Congress grew more 
concerned than ever over the well being of the Government 
relating to such contracts. By 1956, a series of 
investigations was initiated led by the GAO. During these 
investigations, numerous Government contractors' books and 
records were examined. The examinations exposed numerous 
cases that reflected gross overpricing of negotiated 
contracts. The underlying cause of this was deemed to be 
contractors over-estimating contract costs or, not 
considering current cost occurrences during periods of 
negotiation. [Ref. 14:p. 2] 
The first effort to counter this problem was taken by 
the Air Force in 1958 when they adopted a requirement to 
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have a contractor provide certified cost data under certain 
conditions. Later in 1959, a Service-wide modification was 
made to the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR). 
This modification mandated certifications for procurements 
that exceeded $100,000 in price where the negotiated price 
was primarily founded on contractors' cost estimates rather 
than on adequate price competition, established catalog or 
market prices or prices set by law or regulation. 
14:p. 3] 
This regulation required that "in the absence of 
effective price competition, the Government's 
negotiating team must be in possession of current, 
complete and accurate cost or pricing data before 
decisions were made on contract prices." [Ref. 
14:p. 2-3] 
[Ref. 
At the time of this change, further Congressional worry 
arose over excessive profit levels in incentive type 
contracts. This concern was fostered largely due to the 
encroaching expiration of the Renegotiations Act of 1951; an 
Act that allowed the Government remedy over such problems. 
This concern was put to rest by extending the Act until June 
of 1962. However, efforts to examine the problem continued. 
As a result of hearings held by the House and Senate Armed 
Services Committees in 1962, the problem of excessive 
profits was formally addressed. The hearing outcomes 
14 
referenced the fact that as contractors overstated cost 
estimates in incentive type contracts they commensurately 
increased profit levels. Without knowledge of actual costs, 
the Government was left at a distinct disadvantage during 
negotiations and could do nothing to prevent the 
overstatement of costs. Proposals to solve this problem 
included contract provisions restricting incentive profits 
to those cases where profit could be traced to a saving 
directly associated with contractor performance. [Ref. 14:p. 
3-5] 
a) Legislation; The House v. The Senate 
In response to these recommendations the House 
Armed Services Committee drafted a new bill in May of 1960 
known as H.R. 12572. H.R. 12572 applied only to incentive 
contract arrangements and required two things: 
• That certified cost data be provided in all 
procurements exceeding $100,000 according to the 
1959 ASPR change described in paragraph B.2. above. 
• That such contracts include a clause requiring a 
price reduction in the event that a contract audit 
unveiled an overstatement of cost or price as a 
result of inaccurate, incomplete or non-current 
data. [Ref. 14:p. 5] 
The House passed H.R. 12572 in June of 1960. 
Shortly thereafter, the Senate met on the identical issue. 
15 
• 
Unlike the House, the Senate believed that such problems 
could be rectified "administratively." [Ref. 14:p. 5] Their 
recommendation was to revise the ASPR to include identical 
features of H.R. 12572 minus a requirement for auditing the 
data. 
H.R. 
This disconnect between the House and Senate left 
12572 idle while the regulatory changes were 
incorporated into the ASPR instead in January of 1961. One 
difference existed between the recommended changes and those 
implemented. This difference was the inclusion of language 
focusing the change on all negotiated, fixed-price 
contracts. This change was placed in the 1961 revision at 
the request of the DOD. [Ref. 14:p. 5] 
C. THE BIRTH OF TINA 
Changes to the ASPR remained effective from January 
through February of 1961. In March, Congressman Herbert 
revived H.R. 12572 under a new title, H.R. 5533. The bill 
was met with contention however, as members of the DOD felt 
that legislation was unnecessary in light of the ASPR 
changes. Minority members in the House also echoed these 
sentiments. Congressman Herbert's defense of the bill, 
simply stated, noted that there was a general service trend 
of non-enforcement of the regulation requiring contractors 
to provide certified cost data. Realizing the gravity of 
16 
this situation, the House voted and passed H.R. 5533 on June 
7, 1962. [Ref 14:p. 5-6] 
From this point the bill was forwarded to the Senate 
for review. The Senate approved the bill on August 10, 1962 
with one major alteration. Because the original proposal 
did not render coverage for other than incentive type 
contracts, the Senate extended coverage to all negotiated 
procurements. Their concern was that contractors might 
decide to move away from incentive arrangements and 
therefore shift current problems from one contract type to 
the next. 
view. 
The General Accounting Office supported this 
The bill, as amended by the Senate, was established as 
law on September 10, 1962 and was put into effect on 
December 1, 1962. In its final form it became known as the 
"Truth in Negotiations Act," or Public Law 87-653. [Ref. 
14iP. 6-7] From this point forward the TINA has been 
amended on four separate occasions, beginning in 1968, and 
continuing until 1989. 
D. THE TINA MANDATES 
To better comprehend what TINA requires the reader 
should understand the intent behind TINA. 
17 
The TINA was enacted to place the Government 
negotiator on equal footing with the contractor at 
negotiations. The legislative intent was to give 
the Government informational parity with 
contractors and subcontractors during price 
negotiations so the Government could avoid 
excessive prices. [Ref. 12:p. 1-2] 
The TINA requirements are embodied in United States Code 10, 
Section 2306a, the legislative residence of TINA. The 
guidelines for implementing these requirements are found in 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 15, Subpart 15.4, 
Negotiated Procurements. The TINA has two major 
requirements in regard to negotiated procurements. They 
are: 
• That all Government contractors submit cost and 
pricing data and certify that such data is current, 
accurate and complete upon the agreement of a 
contract's price . 
• That a downward adjustment be made to a contract's 
price, including profit or fee, where determination 
is made that the price was increased as a result of 
a contractor submitting defective cost or pricing 
data and where the Government relied on the data 
submitted. [Ref. 12:p. 1-1] 
The first applies to all acquisitions that equal or 
exceed a dollar threshold of $500,000 i an increase from 
$100,000 prior to December 5, 1990. This requirement must 
be met in all cases were a plausible TINA exception does not 
exist. Exceptions to this requirement are discussed later 
in this chapter. The second requirement exists to indemnify 
18 
the Government in cases where a discrepancy resides in the 
provision of certified cost and pricing data. It also acts 
as a deterrent to providing such erroneous certified data. 
[Ref. 12:p. 1-1] [Ref. 5:Part. 15.4] 
a) Certified Cost and Pricing Data 
Two things should be understood to fully 
understand the requirements of TINA: 1) What certified cost 
and pricing data are and, 2) When certified data are needed 
and not needed. Both are easily answered, but often 
misinterpreted. The 1987 amendments to TINA known as Public 
Law 99-500 define cost and pricing data as follows: 
Cost or pricing data means all information .that is 
verifiable and that, as of the date of the 
agreement on the price of the contract (or the 
price of a contract modification), a prudent buyer 
or seller would reasonably expect to affect price 
negotiations. Such term does not include 
information that is judgmental, but does include 
the factual information from which a judgment is 
derived. [Ref 11:p. 125] 
Within this context, certified cost and pricing data are 
different from cost and pricing data. Certification 
requires a contractor to certify that data are current, 
accurate and complete as outlined in FAR Part 15.403-4. 
Certification is required under the following circumstances: 
• When contract actions are greater than $500,000 and 
a specific exemption does not apply. 
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• When contract actions are greater than $100,000 but 
less than or equal to $500,000 and the contracting 
officer (CO) determines in writing that the data is 
necessary and this determination has been approved 
by the Head of the Contracting Activity (HCA). 
• Certified cost and pricing data may not be required 
for contract actions less than or equal to $100,000. 
[Ref. 24 :p. 2-6] 
b) ~be Certification Problem 
Both prime contractors and covered subcontractors 
are required to furnish cost and pricing data certificates. 
Preparing data for certification and analyzing such data is 
administratively intensive, costly and time consuming. 
Large quanti ties of materials are needed to substantiate 
data that includes not only historical accounting 
information but also the following: 
• Vendor quotations 
• Nonrecurring costs 
• Information on changes in production methods and in 
production or purchasing volume 
• Data supporting projections of business prospects 
and objectives and related operations costs 
• Unit-cost trends such as those associated with labor 
efficiency 
• Make-or-buy decisions 
• Estimating resources to attain business goals 
• Information on management decisions that could have 
a significant bearing on costs [Ref 24:P. 2-7] 
Contractors must often modify their accounting systems to 
track costs related to Government contracts. Historically, 
the burdens of providing certified cost and pricing data 
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result in a lack of desire by contractors for Government 
business. In March of 1987, a study was conducted by Dr. 
Dave Lanun entitled, "An analysis of reasons companies refuse 
to participate in defense business." In this study Dr. Larnm 
ci tes burdensome paperwork as one of the leading reasons 
civilian companies refuse DOD business. [Ref. 13:p. 88] In 
light of this, the focus of this thesis is to facilitate the 
Government's ability to waive certification requirements 
when it is in their best interest. 
c) Defective Pricing 
The second major requirement of the TINA affords 
the Government remedy in cases where contractors fail to 
adhere to the first requirement. Commensurately, it also 
provides the contractor with an incentive to provide for 
proper adherence. Defective pricing is the term used to 
describe the provision of certified cost or pricing data 
that are not current, accurate or complete. It is 
constituted when: 
Any price, including profit or fee, for any 
purchase action covered by the Certificate, is 
increased by any significant amount because the 
data were NOT accurate, complete, or current and 
the Government relied on that data to reach a 
pricing decision. In such cases the Government is 
entitled to a price adjustment representative of 
the amount overpaid, plus interest. [Ref 24:p. 2-
23] 
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As alluded to earlier, defective pricing is the leading 
reason for the Government's enactment of the TINA. There 
are myriad cases of defective pricing that exist throughout 
the history of Government contracting, most of which have 
reinforced a perceived need for TINA. However, there is 
also a need to examine those cases where the potential for 
defective pricing is low, and actions requiring 
certifications of cost and pricing data should be waived. 
d) ~I~ Exceptions 
Since the inception of TINA and throughout 
amendments to the Act, exceptions have been granted allowing 
the requirement for certified cost and pricing data to be 
circumvented. lAW FAR Part 15.403-1, there are four such 
exceptions: 
• Adequate Price Competition. - Cases where two or 
more responsible offerors, competing independently, 
submit priced offers that satisfy the Government's 
expressed requirement. .. 
• Prices set by law or regulation. - Pronouncements in 
the form of periodic rulings, reviews, or similar 
actions of a Governmental body, or embodied in the 
laws, are sufficient to set a price. 
• Commercial items. Any acquisition for an item that 
meets the commercial item definition in FAR or, any 
modification, as defined in the FAR that does not 
change the item from a commercial item to a 
noncommercial item. 
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• Exceptions. Waivers to the requirement to provide 
certified cost and pricing data may be obtained from 
the head of the contracting activity when other 
exceptions do not apply. Such waivers must be 
submitted in writing outlining and justifying the 
request. Waivers may be sought when the HCA deems 
it unnecessary to provide such data because price 
can be determined as fair and reasonable through 
some other means. For example, when previous 
certified cost and pricing data has been provided in 
close proximity to the need for new data, the old 
data may prove sufficient in determining price 
reasonableness when supplemented with current 
information. Once a waiver has been granted the 
scenario will be treated as if the contractor has 
been required to provide certified data. This 
exception will apply to prime contracts where deemed 
appropriate and will not flow down to the 
subcontracting level unless similar appropriate 
exception can be validated. The ability to grant 
such exception cannot be delegated by the HCA. 
[Ref. 5:Part 15.403-1] 
The fourth "exception" offers a malleable approach to 
apply when the preceding three do not. Caution must be 
taken in applying this exception however, as it does present 
a certain level of risk. The ability to waive the 
certification requirements under this fourth exception is 
the emphasis of this thesis. The application of this waiver 
ability is presented in Chapter IV. This chapter examines 
the policy, approaches and tools used by DOD organizations 
to facilitate waivers. 
e) DOD/Service Level Policy 
As mentioned previously, the primary embodiment of 
policy and procedure relating to TINA and its exceptions is 
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contained in'· the FAR. The FAR provides this at the Federal 
level. FAR policy is further augmented at the DOD and 
Service component levels through the Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), the Army Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS), the Air Force 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AAFARS) and 
finally, the Naval Acquisition Procedures Supplement (NAPS). 
The DFARS implements and supplements current FAR, 
policy and guidance regarding the DOD. It is under 
authorization and subject to the authority, direction, and 
control of the Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 5] Information 
regarding TINA requirements and exceptions are found in 
DFARS Subpart 215.804. This subpart offers little expansion 
on that provided by the FAR. Information regarding TINA 
requirements in the DFARS provides only clarification on 
those organizations and institutions that have been granted 
exemption or certain relief from certain aspects of the 
submission of certified cost or pricing data. Additionally, 
it provides a format to be used when preparing a request for 
waiver of such data. [Ref. 5] 
The AAFARS, AFARS and NAPS carry the 
implementation and supplementation of FAR policy down to the 
Service component level. As with the DFARS, these documents 
currently offer little expansion on the requirements 
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mandated by TINA. The AAFARS provides elaboration only on 
the proper staffing of TINA Waiver requests as well as the 
information that should be contained in each TINA Waiver 
request, while the NAPS and AFARS provide no additional 
policy or guidance at all. Moreover, the recent re-write of 
FAR Part 15 has resulted in obsolescence of the AFARS FAR 
Part 15 coverage. The Army has therefore directed deletion 
of their applicable AFARS Part 15 until formal changes have 
been made. [Ref. 22] 
E. SUMMARY 
The events underlying the enactment of the Truth in 
Negotiations Act are numerous. The chief goals of the 
Government in enacting TINA were protecting the monetary 
interests of the American people while allowing for more 
streamlined methods of procurement. These goals are 
illustrated in every major procurement act and amendments to 
acts and regulations passed from 1941 to present. The Truth 
in Negotiations Act serves as a medium for placing the 
Government and the contractor on equal footing while 
negotiating contracts. It does so by mandating requirements 
for c'ertified cost and pricing data in certain procurements 
and affords adjustments to contract prices when costs 
associated with a contract are misrepresented. 
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TINA also recognizes the need for providing relief from 
its requirements when certain procurement scenarios exist. 
By offering certain exceptions, it offers both the 
contractor and the Government savings in time, manpower and 
cost. Government procurement officials must recognize and 
employ these exceptions in the essence of fairness to the 
contractor and in the interest of completing efficient and 
effective procurements. 
Exceptions to TINA allow a waiver to be requested in 
applicable procurements thus offering the DOD with an 
abili ty to realize savings when other exceptions do not 
apply. Cases may exist where this exception and others do 
not apply however, it is in the best interest of the 
Government to fully explore the alternative for requesting 
waivers where applicable. The following chapter discusses 
whether past and present acquisition reform initiatives give 
the acquisition workforce the ability to exploit this 
opportunity. 
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xxx. THE EFFECTS OF ACQUXSXTION REFORM 
A. XNTRODUCTXON 
The world of Government procurement is laden with an 
exhaustive amount of regulations. Major portions of these 
regulations are focused on saving the dollars of the 
taxpayer while ensuring users' needs are met. The DOD 
procurement community employs some 450,000 people who use in 
excess of 30,000 pages of regulations issued by 79 different 
offices. [Ref. 23:p. 19] These regulations, no matter how 
well suited to protect public interest, are responsible for 
adding approximately 18 percent to the cost of major weapon 
systems purchased by the Government. [ Re f. 19: p . 4 ] This 
added cost stems from the additional requirements that each 
regulation places on the contractor. For example, between 
t.he years of 1984 and 1986 Congress introduced a total of 
390 bills focused on improving the defense acquisition 
process, while at the same time the DOD also instituted its 
own new directives. 
On the current list of regulations the Truth in 
Negotiations Act is the second most costly. [Ref. 26:p. 1] 
TINA I S requirements necessitate that contractors maintain 
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their accounting systems based on the cost of every product 
they sell. Since commercial firms normally do not track 
costs on a product by product basis, contractors are forced 
to implement additional cost accounting systems that 
specifically track Government related costs. The cost 
information provided by these systems is used by the 
Government to make determinations on the fairness and 
reasonableness of the prices offered by each contractor. 
Whether or not TINA's requirements are a prudent business 
practice is hard to say. Some argue that TINA does not 
guarantee an efficient operation and that such regulations 
are increasing procurement costs with little or no added 
value. Others favor such requirements seeing them as the 
only way of protecting taxpayer interests. In either case, 
initiatives have been taken in the last several years to 
reduce the burdens of regulations such as TINA while keeping 
intact the underlying goal of ensuring smart purchasing. 
This chapter elaborates on some of the events of the 
Acquisition Reform movement, both past and present. It 
discusses how certain reforms have increased potential for 
the use of TINA Waivers and what currently impedes the 
reform process. 
28 
B. REFORM EVENTS 
1. Past Reform 
The foundations of acquisition reform are not new. 
Acts of reform began to take place as early as 1808 when the 
Congress passed the provision entitled "Officials Not to 
Benefi t"; a provision that arose out of a need to prevent 
growing corruption in the acquisition process by Government 
Officials abusing their power. [Ref. 10:p. 13] From 1808 
forward, reform initiatives became commonplace in a host of 
areas relating to defense acquisition; there was no shortage 
of effort to balance or improve the way Government acquires 
goods and services. 
A look back through the lineage of acquisition reform 
shows numerous studies that worked to shape and improve the 
procurement process. These studies carry common names and 
are widely recognized within the acquisition workforce. 
They include: 
• The Hoover Commissions (1949 and 1955) 
• The Fitzhugh Commission (1970) 
• The 1972 Commission on Government Procurement 
• The Carlucci Initiatives (1981) 
• The Grace Commission (1983) 
• The Packard Commission (1986) 
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• DMR '89 (The Rittenhouse Report) 
• Studies of the Defense Science Board (1983,86,87,89 
and 91) 
• The Section 800 Panel (1993) 
• The National Performance Review (1993) [Ref. l:p. 1-
3] 
The aforementioned studies and commissions were not all 
directly related to defense procurement, but each made 
recommendations to refine the Government's acquisition' 
system. The Defense Science Board, convened in 1991, 
determined that each of the commissions and studies 
preceding it proposed similar recommendations for 
streamlining acquisition. They also concluded that in spite 
of the myriad streamlining recommendations made by their 
predecessors, the trend within the acquisition community was 
one of a lengthening procurement cycle. As was further 
noted by the 1991 board, the key driver of this trend was 
incomplete implementation of the recommendations made by 
prior reform groups. Compounding this was the fact that 
each reform initiative added even more complex and confining 
regulations than preceding initiatives. The combination of 
these two situations prevented reform from ever being fully 
realized. [Ref. 10 :p. 14] The 1991 board's conclusion was 
that in order for acquisition reform to effect lasting 
change, a "holistic" approach needed to be taken. The 
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Section 800 Panel further supported this conclusion in 1993. 
[Ref. l:p. 1-4] 
2. Current Reform 
In contrast to reform initiatives of the past, current 
acquisition reform efforts seem to be taking much better 
hold. The newest reform attempts deviate dramatically from 
the old by removing cumbersome regulations and replacing 
them with "guiding principles". These guiding principles 
promote and encourage creative thinking and flexibility. 
Mr. Derek Vander Schaff, retired deputy Department of 
Defense Inspector General, cited his impression of current 
acquisition reform initiatives as follows: 
DOD has either been trying or having someone else 
try to reform the acquisition process for as long 
as I can remember. This time there appears to be 
some real progress .... [the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition Reform and staff] have 
advanced the acquisition reform ball further in 
the las t two and a hal f years than it has been 
advanced in the last 20 years by all kinds of 
special commissions. [Ref. 16:p. 5] 
Present acquisition reform can be recognized as 
beginning with the inception of the Section 800 Panel. This 
Panel was instituted by the Fiscal Year 1991 National 
Defense Authorization Act and was tasked with responding to 
the public's desire for a return on their investment of 
downsizing and re-engineering efforts in the military. The 
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panel examined and recommended changes to statutory code 
that would remove resident inefficiencies. [Ref. l:p. 2-2] 
The Panel presented its work to Congress in 1993 in the form 
of an 1800 page report. The report became the source from 
which Congress launched numerous reform initiatives. During 
the course of the Section 800 panel's work, members reviewed 
over 600 statutes, recommending the repeal or amendment of 
nearly 300. "In short, they found a jungle of conflicting, 
obsolete, and ineffective laws which stifled the Federal 
acquisition process and wasted the taxpayers' funds in huge 
amounts." [Ref. 28:p. 1] The work of the panel and its 
recommendations to Congress served as the foundation for 
implementation of one of the most widely recognized reform 
acts in force today, The Federal Acquisition Streamlining 
Act (FASA) of 1994. FASA is discussed in more detail later 
in this chapter and has a significant bearing on the 
requirements of TINA. 
In close proximity to the work of the Section 800 
panel, Vice President Gore launched another maj or reform 
initiative in 1993. Gore introduced a national agenda of 
re-inventing Government entitled the National Performance 
Review (NPR). The NPR consisted of a team of people with 
knowledge in organizational change and experience in 
industry and the Department of Defense. The NPR focus is a 
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commitment to change in the DOD that will enhance the 
Government's procurement processes. The NPR is a forerunner 
in the advance of acquisition reform initiatives and 
provided great impetus to enact FASA. [ Re f. 1: p . 2 - 3 ] 
Upon assuming the reigns as Secretary of Defense in 
February 1994, Dr. William J. Perry assumed direction of the 
NPR initiative in the DOD. In concert with the NPR focus, 
Secretary Perry issued his DOD Acquisition reform vision on 
February 9, 1994. This vision was published in a document 
entitled Acquisition Refor.m-A Mandate for Change. This 
document continues to serve as the guidepost for DOD reform 
initiatives. [Ref. l:p. 2-3] [Ref.17] 
Dr. Perry's first action upon assuming office was to 
restructure the OSD staff and establish a Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform. Control of 
this office was given to Colleen Preston who was tasked with 
developing and implementing a coherent and practical step-





reengineering each segment of the 
Moreover, 
ensuring 




institutionalization of all approved Acquisition Reform 
changes. 
The next section, while not a reform initiative, 
provides insight into a reform imperative, cultural change. 
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The issue of cultural change is a front-runner in the line 
of current stumbling blocks to acquisition reform and must 
be understood to effectively institute lasting change. 
C. CULTURE CHANGE 
Changing the culture of the acquisition workforce is 
vi tal to the smooth transition and success of the reform 
movement. Prior to the current acquisition reform movement, 
contracting officers have relied heavily on legislation as 
the "guidebook" for conducting business. Throughout this 
period legislation addressed every procurement problem that 
surfaced, creating a paradigm that left no room for 
creativity in the procurement process. Acquisition was 
conducted "strictly by the book". Under this paradigm 
performance appraisals of the acquisition workforce were 
largely based on how well they followed the rules. Thinking 
creatively or "outside the box" 
'characteristics frowned on by 
were negative performance 
senior management. In 
contrast, recent acquisition reform legislation is aimed at 
shifting this paradigm and incentivizing personnel to become 
problem sol vers and thinkers. Al though easy in theory, 
institutionalizing this cultural change has been difficult. 
Several prominent acquisition officials have described the 
impediments. 
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In a June 1997 interview in Armed Forces Journal 
Dr. Paul Kaminski, then Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition and Technology), compared the 
implementation of acquisition reform to an 
hourglass. Kaminski said those in the top of the 
echelon want reform and those at the working level 
want reform. However, constriction blocks the 
process in the middle, just as sand flowing 
through an hourglass slows to a trickle. [Ref. 
3 :p. 14] 
An interview with Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition Reform, Colleen A. Preston, revealed her 
thoughts on the process. "The most unavoidable challenge 
facing acquisition reform is going through the needed 
cultural change." [Ref. 3 :p. 14] Finally, in the Death of 
Common Sense, a book written by Phillip K. Howard, he makes 
the observation that: 
Our regulatory system has become an instruction 
manual. Detailed rule after detailed rule 
addressing every eventuality, or at least every 
situation lawmakers and bureaucrats can think of." 
[Ref. 3:p. 15] 
This resistance to change indicates a need for 
continued support of Acquisition Reform by the DOD's 
leadership. The new wave of thinking must be internalized 
in order for bona fide changes to occur. 
Culture change within the DOD encompasses changing a 
corporate culture. The term "culture change" is used 
frequently by members of the DOD procurement community but 
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not often in practice. According to Dr. Vijay Sathe, a 
Professor of Organizational Behavior, there is no "one 
unanimously accepted definition" of culture. [Ref. 21;p. 
329] When discussing corporate culture, Sathe uses two 
preferred views of culture referred to as "what is directly 
observable about the members of community--that is, their 
patterns of behavior, speech, and use of material objects", 
and "what is shared in the community members' minds". [Ref. 
21:p. 329] Sa the advocates that in order to produce a 
culture change; managers must comprehend and actively 
influence things in each of the basic processes that cause a 
cuI ture to perpetuate itself. His model of perpetuating 
culture, found in Figure 1 below, illustrates these 
processes. The numerical values in the model show where a 
manager must intervene in order to bring about change. Most 
important to note is that intervention must take place at 
each of these points vice only one. Without intervention in 
multiple areas a change cannot be realized. 
Once management begins to understand the intricacies of 
effecting cultural change and makes a strong and clear 
commitment to it, the realities of change will take place. 
Adding to the concepts behind changing culture the General 
Accounting Office conducted a study in 1992 that included 
obtaining views from experts in the private sector on the 
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Figure 1. How Culture Perpetuates Itself 
[Ref. 21:p. 337]. 
techniques used to change an "organizational culture". 
According to these sources (one of which being Sathe), two 
techniques are considered to be most important in making a 
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successful culture change: top management support and 
training. When these two are combined and used in concert 
with techniques such as those found in the above model, a 
cultural change can be effected. [Ref. 27:p. 1-8] Changes 
in policy and regulation do not by themselves create the 
change sought by acquisition reform. 
To make a lasting contribution to the procurement 
system,Government officials need to understand that 
cultural change is more than just changing the rulebook. 
With this in mind, the next section will offer insight into 
a specific acquisition reform that has had a profound impact 
on the acquisition process. This reform, known as FASA, 
brings with it a need for cultural change. 
D. FEDERAL ACQUSISTION STREAMLINING ACT OF 1994 
The first significant action of the current acquisition 
reform movement was the passage of the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994. This Act initiated several 
changes to acquisition regulations and had a penetrating 
impact on the Government's ability to seek relief from TINA 
cost and pricing data submittal requirements. 
Based largely on Section 800 Panel recommendations, 
FA SA revised more than 225 statutory rules affecting defense 
acquisition. 
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In a nutshell, it [FASA] encourages agencies to 
rely on commercial, off-the-shelf products instead 
of those designed to Government unique 
specifications and simplifies procedures for 
buying those items. It also reduces requirements 
for contractors to submit cost data and exempts 
purchases below $2,500 from certain procurement 
requirements. In addition, the law establishes a 
simplified acquisition threshold of $100,000, 
waives certain laws for procurement pilot programs 
and makes more contracts accessible to small and 
disadvantaged business'es. It amends the process 
for resolving protests and contract disputes, and 
requires agencies to develop and implement 
computer network architecture for conducting 
procurements electronically. [Ref 2:p. 3A] 
In regard to TINA's requirement for cost and pricing 
data provisions, FASA introduced several changes to the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) via Federal Acquisition 
Circular (FAC) 90-32. [Ref. 6:p. 1] These changes include 
instituting a new order of priority for pricing information, 
creating a clear distinction between cost or pricing data 
and other information and establishing the request for cost 
or pricing data as a method of last choice. In line with 
this the FAR now prohibits contracting officers from 
obtaining cost and pricing data if an exception to TINA 
applies. In cases where an exception does not apply, it 
encourages the pursuit of a waiver if price reasonableness 
can be determined without resorting to cost and pricing 
data. The reasons for these changes are simple; a reliance 
on cost or pricing data when unnecessary: (1) increases 
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proposal preparation costs, (2) extends acquisition cycle 
times and, (3) wastes the resources of both the contractor 
and the Government. [Ref. 20:p. 53] 
FA SA changes the rules but does not alleviate the 
responsibilities of the contracting officer in determining 
price reasonableness. Instead, it offers the contracting 
officer an ability to rely on different, more efficient 
methods for supporting his analysis of price. The 
contracting officer now works with an "inverted pyramid", 
starting from the small and working to the big. The pyramid 
stipulates three basic levels of information that the 
contracting officer should pursue. They include: 
• No further information from an offeror. This level 
takes effect when price is based on adequate price 
competition and does not include provisions in the 
current FAR Part 15.403-3(b). 
• Cost or Price related information. This category or 
level includes information from both the contractor 
and other sources that do not meet the definition of 
cost or pricing data at FAR 15.401. It includes 
other than "certified" data. 
• Cost or Pricing Data. This level includes cost or 
pricing data that require certification in 
accordance with the current FAR Part 15.406-2. 
[Ref. 5:Subpart 15.4] 
By mandating the pursuit of information in this order, 
FASA gives the contracting officer the flexibility of 
determining price reasonableness through less costly and 
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more innovative means than advocated prior to its arrival. 
Providing certified cost and pricing data is no longer the 
defaul t as in past acquisition practices. The Government 
acquisition community now has the ability to be creatively 
smart and cost effective where it used to be strictly safe 
and rule bound. This new order of priority does not negate 
scenarios requiring the merits of certified cost and pricing 
data but instead reduces the instances where it should be 
needed. It also does not reduce the risk involved with not 
requesting certified data. Risk is an inherent part of the 
decision process. However, in light of the reform goal of 
streamlining procurements, the contracting officer must now 
learn to shift his focus from risk avoidance to risk 
management. The new rules invoke a need to have a common 
awareness of the availability of other avenues that provide 
the contracting officer, the contractor and the public with 
substantial benefits. The benefits that arise out of the 
new rules equate to cost savings, increased productivity, 
better partnering relationships and reduced acquisition 
cycle times. 
The movement from rule bound decision making to 
creative thinking requires a wholesale change to the 
acquisition corporate culture. This culture change is and 
continues to be a rough obstacle to overcome. The next 
41 
section presents an overview of the overarching policy 
changes to the FAR that serve to foster this culture change. 
E. FAR GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
As the current wave of acquisition reform attempts to 
push forth an aura of flexible and innovative thinking, the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation serves to foster such. 
Unlike previous versions of the FAR, the new re-written' 
version includes an overarching statement of guiding 
principles that stands to facilitate the Acquisition Reform. 
Within the statement of guiding principles the vision of the 
Federal Acquisition System is: 
To deliver on a timely basis the best value 
product or service to the customer, while 
maintaining the public's trust and fulfilling 
public policy obj ecti ves. Participants in the 
acquisition process should work together as a team 
and should be empowered to make decisions within 
their area of responsibility. [Ref. 5:p. 1-1] 
In order to pursue this vision the guiding principles lay 
out methodologies in succinct form for accomplishing this 
goal. They are: 
• Satisfying the customer in terms of cost, quality, 
and timeliness of the delivered product or service . 
• Minimizing administrative operating costs. 
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• Conducting business with integrity, fairness and 
openness and; 
• Fulfilling public policy objectives. [Ref. 5:p. 1-1] 
The framework of the guiding principles illustrates a 
commitment by the Government's policy makers to allow 
members of the acquisition workforce to be creative. As 
mentioned in the vision statement, the workforce should be 
"empower~d to make decisions within their area of 
responsibility". Empowerment facilitates one's ability to 
be creative by removing the burden of approval by management 
that often stifles one's creativity. As stated by Colleen 
Preston: 
I think the most critical aspect of what we've 
done during my tenure here is ... the notion that we 
have to empower the workforce. In some cases we 
have been successful unless people believe that 
they can change the process within which they 
work. [Ref. 18:p. 29] 
The guiding principles further the commitment to 
empowerment and creativity by promulgating guidance to 
pursue actions that are in the best interest of the 
Government but which are not specifically addressed in FAR, 
or prohibited by law. [Ref. 5:p. 1-2] These changes to the 
FAR serve as a foundation for cultural change within the 
acquisition workforce. It is imperative that leadership at 
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all levels within the Government know, understand and 
embrace these principles. A lack of internalizing this 
guidance will only keep procurement on the path of the 
status quo. 
F. SUMMARY 
Acquisition reform initiatives have been in place 
throughout many years of the DOD's procurement history. 
However, it was not until the current reform movement began 
in 1993 that reform initiatives began to make bona fide 
improvements to the way the Government procures its goods 
and services. Al though current reforms have taken a much 
better hold than those of the past have, a cultural change 
will need to take place within the acquisition workforce if 
reform is to continue to perpetuate itself. Reform 
initiatives such as the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
and its commensurate changes to the FAR illustrate efforts 
that allow creative and less cumbersome practices to take 
place, such as TINA Waivers, but a commitment will be 
required on the part of the DOD's leadership to make them 
profound. The next chapter presents information and data 
gathered to show how such reforms have effected the use of 
TINA Waivers within the DOD community. 
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IV. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. 
presents a summary of the data collection. 
First, it 
Second, it 
provides an analysis of the data with a focus on answering 
the research questions in Chapter I. 
The data in this chapter were obtained through several 
media. Written surveys and onsite interviews gathered the 
major portion of the data. The remaining portion was 
collected in hard copy document form and through phone 
interviews with members of the DOD acquisition workforce 
throughout various service commands. Lastly, a literary 
review of books, periodicals and information on the world 
wide web was used as a supplement. 
Two different surveys provide the basis for information 
collection. The first survey focuses on extracting TINA 
waiver experiences of Procuring Contracting Officers (PCOs), 
Contract Specialists and Program Executive Officers (PEas) 
at the Naval Air Systems Command. These surveys were 
distributed concurrently with onsite interviews. Interviews 
facilitated the assimilation of survey information. The 
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second survey is similar in nature, but focuses on gathering 
TINA Waiver information from a select group of defense 
aerospace contractors. This latter survey does not include 
the use of onsite interviews. Each of the two surveys 
incorporates the use of qualitative analysis as opposed to a 
quantitative approach. This research is concerned more with 
describing concerns surrounding the utilization of TINA 
Waivers vice quantitative aspects of their use. Where 
survey data lend themselves to quantitative presentation, 
such an approach is used to facilitate data presentation and 
analysis. 
The remainder of the data are in the form of active 
policy and guidance documentation, formal waiver requests, 
historical procurement and analysis records, the DOD 
workforce's personal experiences and literature reviews. 
These data are beneficial in supplementing and providing a 
base of comparative information in regard to the data 
collected by survey. 
B. RESEARCH LiMiTATiONS 
During the process of gathering data the researcher 
discovered the following limitations: 
• Not all survey respondents provided completed 
surveys. The response rate was 83 percent. In some 
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cases certain respondents did not answer all 
questions contained in the survey, in others no 
survey was answered at all. Certain segments of the 
examined population are therefore unspoken regarding 
different aspects of TINA Waivers. 
• In some cases, DOD organizations had undergone 
restructuring and consolidation. In one of these 
instances, contracting personnel left their 
positions at the procurement organization and TINA 
related record archives were not carried forward. 
Therefore, some of the information collected during 
this thesis is based on respondents' personal 
recollections vice verifiable records. 
• Some personnel were unavailable for questioning 
during periods of data accumulation. Many of these 
personnel were the sole proprietors of certain TINA 
Waivers executed at their command. This leads to 
instances where a waiver was processed, but no 
details of the waiver beyond information exacted 
from existing waiver documentation could be drawn. 
Each limitation causes a certain degree of disjointedness 
in the data. In these instances, the researcher either 
extrapolated from known data or excluded segments of the 
data. 
C. SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) served as 
the base population of study for this thesis. The research 
focused on improving the Naval Aviation acquisition process. 
In total, 12 interviewees from NAVAIRSYSCOM were asked to 
complete corresponding surveys. Each interviewee processed 
47 
a TINA Waiver recently or in the past. Six interviews were 
conducted with current or prior PCOs, five interviews were 
conducted with current Contract Specialists and one 
interview was conducted with a PEO. Of these interviews, 83 
percent provided written survey responses. The cause of 
personnel failing to return surveys seems to be related to 
normal workload constraints. 
Remaining surveys were sent to each of five DOD 
aerospace contractors who produce aviation or missile assets 
for the U.S. Government. These surveys were directed to the 
Director of Contracts at each contractor facility. Of these 
surveys, five of five (100%) contractors responded with two 
contractors providing two survey responses each. 
D. TI:NA WAI:VER USE 
This section presents data obtained in response to 
survey questions as well as other sources mentioned above. 
Each portion of data is followed by analysis. Survey 
responses and other information are summarized 
quantitatively where practical and subjectively summarized 
for qualitative and open-ended information. Both types of 
information are presented in consolidated form throughout 
the chapter. This offers insight on common topics of 
inquiry across the whole base of collected information. 
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Data are presented under five general topic areas: 1) 
Programs Utilizing TINA Waivers, 2) Procurement Activity 
Policy and Guidance, 3) Methodologies of Waiver Use, 4) The 
Effects of Waivers and, 5) Opinions on Waivers. Notice that 
all information is presented in a non-attributional format. 
Survey respondents and interviewee requested 
responses remain anonymous. Appendices A and 




provides a listing of Government and contractor personnel 
receiving the surveys. 
1. Programs Utilizing TINA Waivers 
To determine whether there is an increasing trend in 
the use of TINA Waivers within DOD aviation procurements the 
researcher collected input from three maj or service 
commands: the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM), the 
Aviation Systems Command (ASC) and the Aviation and Missile 
Command (AMCOM). Each source represents a major aviation 
procurement center for i ts respective Service, procuring 
aircraft, cruise and tactical missiles. For the purpose of 
this study both aircraft and missiles are considered 
"aviation assets". 
Two pieces of data were requested from each command: 
(1) the number of contractual awards that had been processed 
between fiscal years 1993 and 1998 requiring certified cost 
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and pricing data and (2) the number of contractual actions 
which waived the requirement for certified cost or pricing 
data for the same time period. 
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the percentage of TINA 
Waivers that were successfully 
organization from Fiscal Year 1993 
processed by each 
to Fiscal Year 1998. 
Percentages are based on a ratio of waivers processed to 
contractual awards requiring certified cost or pricing data 
per fiscal year. This information was obtained by querying 
historical DD Form 350 information maintained by each 
command. Queries were submitted using basic, noncompetitive 
contract awards greater than, or equal to, $500,000 as the 
main parameter of search and include Basic Ordering 
Agreements (BOA) at the same dollar value. 
The data illustrate that the percentage of TINA Waivers 
executed increased dramatically from Fiscal Year 1993 to 
1998 at the NAVAIRSYSCOM. However, little change was noted 
at ASC and AMCOM levels fluctuate around 5 percent. 
To gain an industry perspective on TINA Waiver use, the 
researcher solicited input from defense contractors. The 
following survey questions were used to do so. 
Question. In the face of Government Acquisition 
Reform, specifically, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining 





Figure 2. TINA Waivers Processed Illustrated as a 
Percentage of Non-Competitive Contract Awards ~ $500,000. 
[Source: Developed by Researcher] 
Activities you do business with being more proactive towards 
the use of TINA Waivers? 
[83.3% Responded NO] [16.7% Responded YES] 
Of those contractors responding no, each provided a 
similar explanation stating that PCOs are reluctant to 
request waivers and therefore resort to requiring certified 
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cost and pricing data for most contract proposals. In 
comparison, the percentages of TINA Waivers used amongst the 
Services seem to support this response. Although there is 
an increasing trend of waiver use within NAVAl RSYSCOM, no 
such continual upward trend is present at either of the 
other two commands. In light of this, the researcher 
assumes that the implementation of FASA affected the use of 
waivers in some positive form, but neglected to create an 
overwhelming and sustained impact across all Service 
aviation procurement commands. When considering the 
surveyed voice of the aerospace industry it appears that 
there is avoidance on the part of many Government 
contracting officials to seek waivers. Explana tions for 
this can take on many presumptions. When exploring answers 
the researcher' made an assumption based on the commonality 
of responses that stated, "PCOs were reluctant". The 
assumption was that there is potential in certain cases for 
exploring the use of a waiver but, certain PCOs will not 
explore this potential. Based on this assumption, the 
researcher draws the conclusion that these PCOs either 
deemed the alternative of a waiver too risky or felt largely 
unsure of requesting a waiver. Either of these two may stem 
from a combination of things. However, the researcher 
hypothesizes that a lack of TINA Waiver guidance and a 
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cuI tural tendency toward the safety net of certified data 
are to blame. If such impediments are to blame, remedy can 
be brought forth in the form of expanded guidance to PCOs on 
the use of TINA Waivers. Such a remedy can also incorporate 
increases in the efforts of senior leadership to foster 
cultural receptiveness to the use of waivers and other 
reform tools. 
2. Procurement Activity Policies and Guidance 
The matrix in Figure 3 below presents the official 
policy and guidance hierarchy in use at each organization 




Federal DOD Level Service Command 
Policy Policy Policy Policy 
FAR DFARS (NAPS) iNO PPM #170 
WAIVER 
INFO 
FAR DFARS (AFARS) NONE 
CURRENTLY EXISTS 
OBSOLETE 
FAR DFARS AAFARS NONE 
EXISTS 
Figure 3. TINA Policy and Guidance Structure. 
[Source: Developed by Researcher] 
Interviews with policy personnel at each command 
revealed that only NAVAIRSYSOM maintains local TINA Waiver 
policy or guidance beyond that at the Service level. 
Appendix C presents a copy of NAVAIRSYSCOM's local policies 
and procedures document, AIR-2 . 0 Policy & Procedures 
Memorandum #170. Examination of each of the documents in 
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Figure 3 shows that waiver policy remains in line with the 
FAR's overarching guidance. Each document is positive 
toward the use of waivers given the ability to accurately 
determine price and price reasonableness. 
The researcher next attempted to identify TINA Waiver 
guidance existing outside each command's policy hierarchy 
that is readily available to the workforce. Extensive 
searches of common acquisition publications and websites 
were conducted. Only one common reference provides such 
waiver guidance, Version 2.5 of the Defense Acquisition 
Deskbook (DAD). This source contains a section dedicated to 
providing examples of DOD cost or pricing data waivers, as 
solicited by OUSD (A&T) DP Memo, dated 6 Aug 1997, which 
were successfully processed. Currently there are eight 
waiver examples, each containing the following categories of 
useful information: 
• Pricing action for which waivers are granted. 
• Type of data required from the offeror. 
• Description of how the price is determined to be 
fair and reasonable . 
• Benefits achieved from using a waiver. 
In addition to each waiver example, the DAD also 
provides a list of common questions that PCOs may ask 
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1. Does approving this waiver make good business sense? Why? 
2 . What price analysis technique or combination of techniques will 
the POD use to determine price reasonableness? 
3. Do you know what minimum data you will need to perform the price 
analysis? Where will you get this data? 
4. What additional data is available and nay be used to supplement 
the price analysis? 
5. What additional data, not yet available, will the PCO obtain and 
use for the price analysis? 
6. What are the ~ial circumstances of this acquisition? What 
makes the basis for the request "exceptional?" 
7 • If the PCO anticipates obtaining data from the offeror is that 
data part of the :minimum required to determine price reasonableness? 
What assurances from the offeror do you have that they will provide'--
the data? 
8. What is the current IX:AA defective price risk assessment? 
9 . If basing price reasonableness on price analysis using recent 
negotiations for the same or similar item, then has there been any DP 
findings on that proposal? 
10. Have you consulted with OCAA on this TINA waiver request? What 
issues did they raise? How have they been resolved? 
11. Have you consulted with rx:M: on this TINA waiver request? What 
issues did they raise? How have they been resolved? 
12. Are there any significant deficiencies with the estinating 
system? Are savings clauses recomnended? 
13. Are there any litigations pending that could be inpacted by an 
approved waiver? 
14. Does the waiver apply to subcontractors and lower tiers? 
15. Should any subcontractors be· excluded from the waiver? 
Table 1. Questions for Considering a TINA Waiver. [Ref. 25] 
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themselves when considering the use of a waiver. 
presents these questions. 
Table 1 
The documents found in Figure 3 present information on 
TINA Waivers through a strong base of policy and procedure. 
These documents lack, however, "guidance" in the form of 
business related considerations to be made when 
contemplating the use of a waiver. Of exception is the 
NAVAIRSYSCOM's Policies and Procedures Memorandum. This 
document provides a well-rounded list of important items to 
consider before requesting a waiver. Moreover, it provides 
the user with a list of generic characteristics that should 
ideally exist in the procurement scenario before a waiver is 
considered as a smart business decision. In comparison, 
nei ther of the other Services provides such a tool. The 
researcher found the only guidance for TINA Waivers beyond 
that in the DFARS in the DAD. The DAD presented what 
appeared to be a good foundation of considerations that 
could be made by PCOs in order to make sound waiver 
decisions. The downside to this information was its absence 
from mandatory policy documents. The implications of this 
may well exist in the form of fewer waiver requests, as 
demonstrated by both the data in Figure 2 and the opinions 
of the aerospace contractors cited earlier. 
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These findings are disturbing. Although the waiver 
process is not readily applicable to every procurement 
scenario, it does present a means of streamlining the 
acquisition process. with streamlining comes some 
commensurate benefit(s). However, the PCO faces an 
impediment when deciding to waive certification of cost and 
pricing data. The impediment comes in the appearance of the 
risk associated with such a decision. This risk can be 
found in the form of being unable to accurately determine 
price reasonableness for the procurement. The consequence 
of such an action is the risk of paying a higher price for 
an item than is necessary. Although the waiver process may 
never be made entirely void of such risk, commands can 
provide guidance to assist PCOs in making ,resourceful waiver 
decisions and thereby offer them assistance in reducing the 
risk they will face. The data examined by the researcher 
identified a lack of such guidance in the different 
mandatory policy documents now used to make TINA Waiver 
decisions, as well as no guidance at some lower levels. 
Although guidance did appear in the common reference of the 
DAD, it would be logical that more guidance could be 
promulgated at both higher and lower policy echelons. 
Offering more guidance and less policy might result in 
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promoting TINA Waiver efforts, while remaining wi thin the 
intent of the FAR's Guiding Principles. 
The researcher believes that a lack of available 
guidance at each level stifles the acquisition reform 
initiative and the use of TINA Waivers. With the 
acquisi tion workforce still heavily rooted in a "by the 
rulebook" mentality, a necessity exists for restructuring 
the rulebook. Incorporating increasing amounts of guidance 
into the mandatory documents governing procurement can 
foster workforce creativity and drive. The FAR's guiding 
principles provide a foundation for such. Moreover, by 
using Say the's model presented in Figure 1, an illustration 
can be made for increasing guidance. As more guidance 
becomes the norm, changes in cultural communications may 
occur. As these communications are changed, cultural change 
sought by the current acquisition reform effort is 
facilitated. According 









theoretically require adjustment in order to perpetuate a 
sought after culture. 
This section illustrates that little in the way of 
formal. guidance vice policy and procedure exists on the use 
of TINA Waivers. However, one Navy command has instituted 
waiver implementation guidance at the procurement command 
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level, therefore making up the shortfall of guidance at 
higher levels. The researcher surmises that increasing TINA 
Waiver guidance and reducing redundant policy may augment 
efforts to change the acquisition culture. As a result, the 
workforce may more readily contemplate the use of innovative 
tools such as TIN~ Waivers and successfully implement them. 
3. Methodologies of Waiver Use 
One of the key aspects of providing information helpful 
to promoting the use of TINA Waivers is to determine current 
and past practices used to successfully implement waivers. 
Information from PCOs, Contract Specialists and PEOs on 
procurement attributes and tools that facilitate waiver use 
expressed such current and past practices. Information in 
this regard is presented from surveys, interviews and actual 
copies of waiver requests approved by respective authorities 
at each procurement command. To offer perspective from each 
Service, the identical organizations depicted in Section 2 
are also discussed here in Section 3. An industry 
perspective is provided through relevant survey data 
obtained from defense aerospace contractors. Information in 
this section is presented under two categories: 1) 
Procurement Attributes and 2) Analysis Tools. Procurement 
attributes are those common across successfully implemented 
waivers. Analysis tools are estimating and other tools 
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recommended or used by procurement personnel to conduct the 
price analysis necessary when using a waiver. 
a) Procurement Attributes 
By examining waivers from each service, the 
researcher discovered several common attributes across each 
waiver case. The researcher believes that these attributes 
indicate the suitability of a procurement for using a 
waiver. Of the attributes found, some are more frequent 
than others. For presentation purposes, the researcher 
categorizes the attributes in Figure 4 as more frequently 
found and less frequently found. The more frequently found 
attributes appeared in at least 80 percent of the waiver 
cases examined. The less frequently found attributes may 
have only surfaced in one particular' waiver case but 
distinguished themselves as being extremely important to 
determining the use of a waiver in the case in which they 
were found~ In total, 20 waivers serve as the basis for the 
researcher's findings. Ten of the twenty waivers were 
executed by the Navy, seven by the Air Force and the 
remaining three by the Army. Figure 4 presents the 
attributes found in their respective categories. 
Numerous indicators and tools exist for deciding 














MORE FREQUENTLY FOUND ATTRIBtJ'l'ES 
Stable end item or component configuration. 
Extensive actual cost history (5 or more year's worth) . 
Stable contractor base. 
Recent DCAA/DCMC audit on past cost data (within 2 
years) . 
Previously submitted in house certifications of cost and 
pricing data (within 2 years). 
Minimal modifications or changes to the item 
configuration during the procurement using the waiver. 
Minimal or no existence of cases of contractor 
defective pricing. 
DCMC/DCAA audited contractor-estimating systems with 
good ratings. 
LESS FREQUENTLY FOUND ATTRIBtJ'l'ES 
Previous TINA Waivers conducted on procurements that 
were similar or identical. 
Last production buys of the item. 
Similar procurement conducted by another Service using 
TINA Waiver. 
Extensive should cost or similar pricing estimates 
done by cognizant pricing specialists (e.g. A Joint 
Cost Estimate Team) . 
Figure 4. TINA Wa1ver Procurement Attr1butes. 
[Source: Developed by Researcher] 
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several key attributes that were found to be common in 
procurement where a waiver was processed successfully. The 
first list of more frequently found attributes prevailed in 
most waiver cases that were examined. These attributes are 
indicative of assets in their "mature" stages of production. 
The existence of maturity in a program was found to bring 
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with it a stable base of characteristics offering an 
excellent suitability to the use of a waiver. In the 
ini tial phases of an asset's lifecycle, numerous growing 
pains are experienced; modifications are made, contractors 
and suppliers may be switched, audits have not been 
conducted and cost history is minimal. These idiosyncrasies 
make it hard to estimate price due to constant changes. 
Once these changes stabilize, continuity appears across 
these areas and the case for a waiver becomes more prudent. 
While examining waivers the researcher found only two 
instances where waivers were used on other than mature 
production assets. These instances involved two distinct 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) efforts. In 
these cases, early planning for procurement of the end item 
involved extensive joint cost analysis producibility studies 
conducted between the contractor and the Government. Each 
study was conducted similar to that of a should-cost effort. 
The results of these studies yielded what was considered to 
be a well-founded determination of asset producibilty costs 
prior to manufacturing efforts. Each cost analysis was 
facilitated by extensive amounts of cost history for assets 
that were extremely similar in design to the item being 
considered for production. This cost history included costs 
for identical components to those being considered for use 
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in the EMD effort. This collage of available cost 
information coupled with extensive analyses provided PCOs 
with the ability to determine price reasonableness similar 
to that which could be offered by requiring certified cost 
and pricing data. These cases were indicative of 
procurements containing the less frequently found attributes 
listed in Figure 3. Less commonly found attributes were 
therefore extracted from waiver cases that were atypical of 
the mainstream waiver scenarios examined. These particular 
cases may have contained several of the more commonly found 
attributes and one or more of the less commonly found 
attributes as highlights of individuality of the 
procurement. What was of particular importance to the 
researcher was the fact that none of the attributes 
presented herein were highlighted in any of the policy 
documents listed in Section 2. 
In light of the information presented on waiver 
attributes the researcher believes that the information in 
Figure 3 presents a good starting point for investigating 
potential waiver use. However, because certain procurement 
scenarios present themselves as being "atypical", as in the 
EMD instances presented above, PCOs may wish to keep other 
considerations in mind. For example, in the case of the EMD 
efforts cited, other means of cost estimating were used that 
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allowed determination of price and price reasonableness 
without certified cost or pricing data. With this in mind, 
the possibility for a waiver can not be ruled out simply 
because none of the attributes cited above are present. 
Instead, one may search for characteristics that offer 
opportunities similar to those found during the EMD effort 
that may facilitate the use of a waiver. The researcher 
believes that one thing should be kept in mind, however; the 
ability to accurately determine price reasonableness is an 
end goal. In many cases, information used to conduct price 
analysis may not carry merit and may result in inaccurate 
determinations of price. The age old "Garbage In, Garbage 
Out" rule therefore appears to apply when -making such 
considerations. 
b) Analysis Tools 
To gain insight into the tools and aids used to 
ascertain price and price reasonableness, the researcher 
solicited information on the pricing tools and aids that 
have been used successfully in past waiver situations. 
Myriad tools and aids are currently in use for assisting 
those seeking TINA Waivers. The following list presents 
tools and aids found during this study: 
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COMMON PRICE ANALYSIS TOOLS/AIDS 
• Audited Actual Cost Data provided in the form of 
Contractor Cost Data Reports (CCDR). 
• Learning Curves. 
• Actual and Negotiated Unit Price Trends. 
• Unit Price trends from other Programs. 
• Trends of Company Profits. 
• Trends of Prior Contract Profits. 
• Un-priced Affordability Initiatives. 
• In Process Findings or Data from Overhead Pricing, 
Operations Audits, Labor Audits or other Systems 
Reviews. 
• Relevant Information from Contractor Briefings. 
• Parametric Estimating Models. 
• DCMC/DCAA Audits. 
• Joint Price Analyses Teams (Contractor and 
Government) 
• Previous Negotiated Cost Base and Settlement 
positions. 
This list represents the tools and aids being used in 
cases of the successful waivers examined; it is by no means 
exhaustive. Additional tools or aids applicable to 
conducting price analysis may be the subj ect of further 
study. Of worthy mention are the initiatives of NAVAIRSYCOM 
to institute a Price Based Estimating Envisioning 
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Laboratory. In concert with the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA), NAVAIRSYCOM is attempting to explore the 
increased use of price-based estimating tools which can 
further the use of price-based estimating methodologies in 
evaluating contract proposals. [Ref. 15] This effort is 
within its infancy and to date, offered no data for the 
researcher to present. The researcher does believe however, 
that the efforts of this laboratory, if successful, may 
further expand the list of price analysis tools available to 
PCOs. 
As the determination for the applicability of a waiver 
becomes more positive, users must reflect on the tools 
available to assess price and price reasonableness. 
Numerous tools, such as those listed above, exist and are 
readily in use for price analysis. As stated previously, 
these analysis tools are not all encompassing. Instead they 
offer what the researcher considers to be a sound base of 
toots from which price analysis options· may be explored. 
These tools have been applied across different waiver 
scenarios with no standards or protocols of use. Different 
tools were used in different waiver cases and were chosen 
based upon their suitability to the procurement. In 
general, those interviewed explore the determination of 
price reasonableness by combining the functionality of these 
66 
analysis tools to make sound determinations. Information 
not gleaned from one tool was extrapolated from another. In 
some instances, information from one was used as input for 
another. In other cases, several tools were used in ooncert 
to ascertain price reasonableness and/or to cross check the 
estimates of another tool. Yet in other cases, mul tiple 
tools were applied and the one that displayed the highest 
degree of correlation was chosen as the one for use. 
Discussions with cognizant personnel using these tools 
determined that no one tool is perfect for every waiver 
scenario. Again, as with the attributes mentioned earlier, 
no current policy regarding waivers highlights these tools 
as recommended resources. Therefore, procurement personnel 
have no real guidance on what tools may be of assistance 
when ascertaining price reasonableness for a waiver. 
In summary, myriad tools exist for determining price 
reasonableness to facilitate the use of TINA Waivers. The 
overriding encumbrance is that none of the tools found by 
the researcher are presented in current policy on the use of 
waivers. Including guidance on pricing tools in these 
documents may arm peDs with the assistance needed to remove 
their reluctance associated with TINA Waivers. 
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4. Effects of Waivers 
Waivers have effects on many aspects of the contracting 
process. This section presents those waiver effects 
presented via surveys and personnel interviews with 
Government and contractor representatives. These effects 
include: 
• The benefits and risks of TINA Waivers. 
• The incentives and barriers of waiver use. 
• The savings generated by waiver use. 
Respondents provided feedback on these topic areas 
based on their experience with previously processed wai ve"rs . 
The information is presented under the following categories: 
1) Benefits and Risks, 2) Incentives and Barriers and 3) 
Savings. 
a) Benefits and Risks. 
Both the Government and contractor realize several 
benefits when using a waiver. Survey data showed that in 
many instances, the Government and contractor identified 
identical benefits. Conversely, only the Government 
expressed a concern for risk when processing a waiver. 
Defense contractors had no real voice about waiver risk. 
The list below presents the benefits and risks noted by the 
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researcher on behalf of the Government and contractor. This 
information is presented in no particular order. 
BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH WAIVER USE 
• Reductions in cost, time and effort associated with 
proposal preparation and negotiations. 
• Reductions in cycle times (RFP to Definitization) 
'and (RFP to production) . 
• More effective use of available personnel. 
• Increased capability to work with a reduced 
workforce. 
• Increased ability to accomplish other required work. 
• Reductions in Bid and Proposal Costs. 
• Reductions in required DCAA/DCMC audits. 
• Reductions in contract price and profit levels. 
• Improvements in parametric estimating techniques. 
• Improvements in overall support capabilities for the 
Government. 
• Improved cont~actor/customer relations. 
RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH WAIVER USE 
(Government Only) 
• Inability to determine a fair and reasonable price 
based on price analysis alone. 
'. Asset pricing inconsistencies reSUlting from 
improper consideration for item modifications and 
changes. 
• Improper use of estimating techniques and tools. 
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• Incapacity to remedy cases of "defective pricing". 
• Excessive negotiation settlements due to a lack of 
current cost history. 
Evident in the data is the fact that waivers 
maintain a potential for both positive and negative effects. 
positive effects exist in the form of the benefits they can 
provide, generalized as savings in time and cost. These 
benefits are critical to the acquisition workforce in an era 
of declining manpower and funding. Waivers can be viewed as 
a viable method of generating needed savings in the face of 
these declines, when and where they can be applied. Of 
importance is the realization that not all of the potential 
benefits found by the researcher would be visible in every 
waiver case. Yet, all survey respondents viewed each 
benefit they realized as a result of a waiver as being worth 
the effort expended in its pursuit. In all cases, 
interviewees strongly preferred the benefits over the costs 
and time associated with full-blown certified cost 
proposals. They noted that waivers provided them with an 
abili ty to dramatically increase procurement efficiency by 
facilitating more streamlined acquisitions. The product 
they boasted of was being able to procure an asset faster, 
and in many cases cheaper, than without a waiver. 
70 
Considering this, the researcher believes that waivers are a 
definite move in the direction of smart purchasing practices 
that provide a stage for good relations between Government 
buyers and commercial sellers. 
Although the benefits of waivers appear 
significant, the risks associated with waivers are just as 
significant. The risks presented by the interviewees 
demonstrate those that might be faced by other PCOs who 
request waivers. Risks are found in several forms and it is 
the contracting officer's job to manage risk when pursuing a 
waiver. Risk reduction comes with contracting officers 
properly assessing and planning for those risks that may 
come with the use of a waiver. with this in mind, the risks 
presented here could be minimized by proper assessment and 
planning. What should be considered is that the potential 
for eliminating risk in entirety will more than likely never 
become a reality. PCOs must therefore learn to accept risk, 
managing it vice avoiding it, in order to ensure limited 
occurrences of the consequences that it can bring. 
b) Incentives and Barriers 
The following presents incentives and barriers 
found by the researcher relating to waiver use. Similar to 
the benefits and risks presented, both the Government and 
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contractor realize these incentives and barriers. Much the 
same, this information is presented in no particular order. 
:INCENT:IVES TO WA:IVER USE 
• Facilitation of commercial-like practices. 
• Improvement of "partnering" relationships. 
• Provision of quick support to units. 
• Increased workload capacity. 
• Quicker funding obligations. 
• Improved capability to work within budget 
constraints. 
BARR:IERS TO WA:IVER USE 
• Reluctance of the workforce to use waivers. 
• Bureaucratic staffing constraints. 
• Lack of waiver guidance. 
• waiver approval level. 
• Risk aversion. 
• Cuitural mentality. 
Of the waiver incentives and barriers discovered 
by the researcher, one incentive and two barriers stood out 
as being most significant. Both the Government and the 
contractor base that were surveyed felt that the greatest 
incentive to using a waiver was the increased workload 
capaci ty that was realized. By eliminating the need for 
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preparing and analyzing cost and pricing data each party 
realized more time to pursue other pressing requirements. 
Each saw this as enhancing their capabilities to perform by 
reducing the workload to be accomplished with the remaining 
workforce, especially during times of high operational 
tempo. In the barrier realm, the Government most strongly 
emphasized the barrier of bureaucratic staffing constraints 
and risk aversion as being the two most limiting factors to 
requesting a waiver. Government personnel felt that too 
much effort was involved in having to sales pitch waivers up 
the chain of command. This barrier, coupled with an 
aversion to risk, set a tendency among personnel to shy away 
from requesting a waiver vice certified cost or pricing 
data. 
c) Savings 
Considering the benefits mentioned earlier, 
attempts were made to quantify the savings that are an 
integral part of these benefits. The researcher's intent 
was to present a spectrum of saving levels that gave 
credence to the scope of savings that can be realized by 
us ing a waiver. The savings found in Table 2 below are 
presented based on actual or estimated figures offered by 
Government personnel and completed waiver documentation. 
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Because the savings found differed dramatically from waiver 
to waiver, the researcher found no real standard applicable 
to savings. It was therefore hypothesized that 
institutionalizing waiver savings might be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible. Instead, the savings 
presented offer the reader some order of magnitude of the 
savings that may be realized by using waivers. These 
savings do not inc 1 ude da ta from surveyed defense 
contractors as they provided little relevant data. Table 1 
is a breakdown of Government savings noted in each category 
of respective savings found. 







Proposal Preparation Time Between 40-75% savings. 
(contractor) . 
Negotiation Time Up to 75% savings. 
Cycle Times Between 2 and 12 month 
savings. 
DCAA/DCMC Audits Between 45-60 day 
savings. 
Asset Price Between 2-14.5% savings. 
Bid and Proposal Costs Between $100-750K saved. 
(contractor) . 
Table 2. Noted TINA Waiver Savings. 
[Source: Developed by Researcher] 
While a number of barriers exist that hinder 
increased waiver activity, numerous incentives also exist 
for increasing waiver use. In order to readily realize the 
benefits of these incentives, mediums must be found to 
overcome the barriers. Consideration must be given to the 
magnitude of waiver savings that are demonstrated in 
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procurements that have successfully utilized waivers (Table 
2). Reflection on these savings shows the positive effect 
waivers can have throughout the procurement cycle. Moreover 
these savings represent benefits that DOD organizations must 
begin to readily experience in the face of declining defense 
dollars. Forgoing these benefits due to a lack of 
perseverance to overcome barriers mentioned may further 
delay the cultural change sought in the acquisition 
community. 
with this in mind, the following section addresses 
some of the relevant opinions on TINA Waivers offered by DOD 
and defense contractor personnel. The researcher considered 
this information to be important as it aids in helping to 
realize what changes might be made to assist in removing the 
impediments found to using TINA Waivers. 
5. Opinions of the Acquisition Workforce 
To culminate information gathering on TINA Waivers, the 
opinions of NAVAIRSYSCOM personnel were sought relating to 
improving the waiver process. Emphasis was given to Navy in 
this regard as this thesis is focused at improving Naval 
Aviation procurement. The following survey questions 
focused on accomplishing this task. 
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Question. What changes in Department of Defense and 
Department of the Navy policy would you propose, to make the 
use of waivers more pronounced? 
Question. What is your perception of the general 
acquisition workforce's feelings toward the use of TINA 
waivers? How do you feel that your command hierarchy views 
the use of waivers? 
Twelve contracting individuals at NAVAIRSYSCOM were 
surveyed on these questions. Eight of the twelve responded 
to the questions. The following responses represent answers 
to these questions synopsized by the researcher presented in 
order of the two questions listed. Each response is 
followed by a percentage of respondents answering similarly. 
• Lower the level of approval authority required for a 
TINA Waiver request. [87.5%] 
• Lower the level of approval to that authority 
capable of approving the Business Clearance 
Memorandum. [37.5%] 
• Establish dollar thresholds for waiver approval 
authority. [12.5%] 
• Provide better guidance on the criteria that should 
be used for deciding the appropriateness of a 
waiver. [12.5%] 
• Determine policy for establishing "blanket" or 
"class " waivers. [12.5%] 
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• Provide policy guidance for considering other 
methods of determining price reasonableness besides 
detailed cost analysis. [12.5%] 
• The acquisition workforce is positive toward the use 
of waivers, but their initiative to use them is 
stifled by high-level approval authority. [87.5%] 
Responses to these questions indicate an overwhelming 
trend of discomfort with the level of approval required to 
obtain a waiver. Interview discussions with personnel at 
NAVAIRSYSCOM amplified these survey responses. Respondents 
felt that the requirement to request waiver approval from 
the Head of the Contracting Activity was much too burdensome 
in spite of the intent of a waiver. Justification was given 
that staffing a waiver normally requires a workload that is 
counterproductive to the reductions in work that are 
byproducts of a waiver. Interviewees stated that this was 
further compounded by the frequency of "staffers" entangling 
themselves in the decisions regarding procurement 
negotiating positions which are derived" by waiver price 
reasonableness determinations. The general consensus was 
that staffers are neither intimately familiar with the 
procurements involving waivers, nor are they well-versed in 
the outcomes associated with waiver analysis. This action 
by staffers often resulted in divestiture of a PCO's 
responsibility and tended to intimidate the PCO from future 
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waiver use. In certain cases this leads to a potential 
"bowing out" of a PCO of the attempt to use a waiver and a 
switch to requesting a full blown cost proposal. 
The opinions of PCDs, Contract Specialists and PEDs 
center on wanting approval for waivers at the level at which 
the Business Clearance Memorandum (BCM) is approved. In 
other cases, support was given to waiver approval authority 
resting at different tiers according to dollar value of 
procurements. In either case, individuals offering these 
opinions felt that in light of current acquisition reforms, 
and the notion of empowering the workforce, that waiver 
approval authority should lie with those most directly 
responsible and familiar with each procurement. 
Consideration of these suggestions seemed plausible to the 
researcher. BCM authorities maintain control over the 
dollar thresholds that negotiators (often the PCD) are 
authorized to engage in during settlement of an asset buy. 
As this is the case, it was felt that the individual who 
approved the BCM should also have the authority to approve a 
TINA Waiver. 
Other interesting considerations for improvement were 
also presented. 
pUblication of 
Two interviewees indicated a desire for the 
increased waiver guidance. Dne person 
recommended the inclusion of waiver guidance to assist in 
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determining the appropriateness of using a waiver. The 
other saw a need for guidance that would assist in deciding 
the appropriate method to be used for conducting price 
analysis used to determine price reasonableness in a waiver 
procurement. Each opinion paralleled and supported those 
findings noted by the researcher during earlier analysis of 
current waiver policy. Lastly, one respondent addressed a 
desire for policy authorizing blanket or class waivers. 
This recommendation included statements that supported the 
use of such waivers in standard procurement scenarios, such 
as a mature production buy, where a waiver could be granted 
with less scrutiny. This involved the procurement having a 
pre-determined set of characteristics. An example would be 
a mature production buy of a stable system platform that 
maintained significant actual cost history, and data, that 
were previously certified and audited at length. Such 
blanket waivers would offer an ability to have waiver 
approval "rubber stamped" avoiding unnecessary briefings to 
higher command echelons. 
In summary, the opinions of current contracting 
personnel at NAVAIRSYSCOM all support changes to current 
waiver policy. The opinions articulate a need to provide 
the acquisition workforce with guidance to make sound waiver 
decisions while empowering them to make choices for or 
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against waivers. These opinions support changes sought by 
current acquisition reform and, if taken for action, may 
facilitate needed cultural changes. The researcher believes 
that the provision of guidance, and authority, may serve to 
remove the tendencies of the acquisition workforce to shy 
away from TINA Waivers and promote their increased use. 
E • CONCLUSION 
TINA Waivers are a medium that can reduce acquisition 
costs and increase procurement efficiency. In light of 
acquisition reform they demonstrate a movement away from 
burdensome regulations and toward more commercial-like 
practices. Although the ability to utilize waivers exists, 
and proven benefits and incentives for their use have been 
illustrated, impediments still exist that prevent 
exploitation of their full potential. Limited policy 
guidance, hierarchical approval levels and inherent risk all 
serve as current obstacles in this regard. Removal of these 
impediments requires continued action by DOD leadership. 
The researcher believes that there are cures that will 
serve to fix these impediments. 
addressed at several levels to 
chapter highlights both the 
Changes will need to be 
make this happen. This 
positive and negative 
characteristics found concerning waivers and serves as the 
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foundation for the conclusions and recommendations that the 
researcher draws about TINA Waivers. The next chapter 
presents the conclusions and recommendations of this study. 
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v . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Acquisition System is currently undergoing 
a series of acquisition reforms that attempt to make 
wholesale efficiency changes to procurement. These reforms 
require a cultural change to occur wi thin the acquisition 
workforce to be fully effective. Residing within the 
current base of reforms are methods that allow acquisition 
professionals to circumvent unnecessary statutory mandates 
that offer no added value in certain procurement scenarios. 
One such method is use of waivers to the Truth in 
Negotiations Act's requirement for certified cost and 
pricing data. 
Considering the ability to waive the TINA requirement 
for certified cost and pricing data, the researcher analyzed 
aspects relating to the current uses of TINA Waivers in the 
aviation procurement realm. To accomplish this a focus was 
given to improving Naval Aviation procurement, using TINA 
Waiver experiences within the Navy, Air Force and Army, as a 
base of information and data. Wi thin these Services the 
researcher examined information and data regarding the 
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overall use of TINA Waivers, the TINA Waiver policy and 
guidance used by each Service, the methodologies employed 
when using waivers, the effects waivers have and the 
opinions that exist within the acquisition workforce. From 
an analysis of this information and data, the researcher 
made the following conclusions and recommendations. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Despi te the upward trend of TINA Waiver use in 
Naval Aviation procurement since the passage of FASA, 
barriers still exist which impede peos from more readily 
requesting waivers. 
The aforementioned conclusion is based on the 
perception of aerospace contractors surveyed in this thesis 
and those waiver statistics, barriers and risks identified 
in Chapter IV. Statistics from Fiscal Years 1993 to 1998 
demonstrate an increasing trend of waiver use at 
NAVAIRSYSCOM since the passage of FASA. However, impeding 
the continued upward momentum of waiver use is reluctance on 
the part of some PCOs to explore options for TINA Waivers 
where potential exists. This conclusion is substantiated by 
the unanimous (100%) agreement of the defense aerospace 
contractors surveyed. The data on actual waivers instituted 
do nothing to demonstrate how often waiver considerations 
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were foregone. The researcher therefore defaults to the 
voice of the aerospace industry as being valid concerning 
how proactive DOD personnel are to consider a waiver 
attempt. 
2. TINA Waivers processed by the DOD demonstrate an 
ability to successfully determine price reasonableness 
through price versus cost analysis on high dollar, major 
systems purchases. Moreover, these procurements can in many 
cases be categorized for price analysis suitability through 
the use of certain procurement attributes. 
Price analysis alone has traditionally only been used 
to evaluate price reasonableness on low dollar, non-
competi ti ve contracts. (Ref. 7 :p. 55) Current DOD TINA 
Waiver cases demonstrate, to the contrary, that price 
analysis can be successful in determining price 
reasonableness on contracts of greater magnitude. The 
success of price analysis in this regard is demonstrated by 
the potential savings illustrated in Table 2, and endorses 
the benefits of such analysis. 
examined through this research 
Secondly, the waiver cases 
display a uniform set of 
attributes that could be used as indicators to determine the 
sui tabili ty of a procurement for price analysis. These 
findings support an ability to increase price-based 
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parametric estimating for major systems purchases more 
effectively in the future. 
3. The level of authority required to approve requests 
for a TINA Waiver may be too high and require modification. 
Opinions of the acquisition workforce at NAVAIRSYSCOM 
who have used waivers speak to a need for lowering waiver 
approval authority. There is a belief that too high a level 
of approval authority stifles ini tiati ve to make a waiver 
request and creates unnecessary administrative burdens. 
These are aspects that are contrary to a waiver's intent. 
The researcher believes in light of acquisition reform that 
lower levels of management should be able to make the 
determination for a waiver. Authority levels currently 
below that of the Head of the Contracting Acti vi ty (HCA) 
hold approval authority for decisions similar to that for a 
waiver, and should therefore be vested with full authority 
for waivers within their area of responsibility. Such 
empowerment would foster attempts to request a waiver by 
removing several of the barriers outlined in Chapter IV. 
4. Insufficient waiver guidance exists across the 
spectrum of DOD aviation procurement commands. 
Current policy regarding TINA Waivers is void of 
guidance that offers a reference for considering the 
business-related aspects of a TINA Waiver decision, bar 
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NAVAIRSYSCOM. All current Federal, DOD and Service command 
policy lacks substantial TINA Waiver guidance which is 
contradictory to the aim of current acquisition reform. 
NAVAIRSYSCOM stands out as the only aviation procurement 
command that has put forth an effort to increase guidance 
through the implementation of a local Policies and 
Procedures Memorandum. However, there is a small percentage 
of personnel at this command that feel more guidance, such 
as that published in the DAD, could be promulgated. The 
researcher presents his thoughts on this in Recommendation 
4. 
5. There is little diversity among the types of 
procurement scenarios where TINA Waivers are being applied 
in aviation related procurements. 
Those examples of TINA Waivers gathered by the 
researcher illustrate that in most cases, bar two, TINA 
Waivers are used predominately in mature, follow-on 
production purchases of an item. The two exceptions noted 
were cases where waivers were used in engineering and 
manufacturing development efforts. Although waiver use may 
be restrictive, the researcher found no information that 
demonstrated that waivers had been attempted in aviation 
procurement scenarios other than those mentioned above. 
This may indicate a further reluctance by the acquisition 
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workforce to consider waivers in cases other that those 
having clear indicators for waiver potential. The one 
example where this paradigm appears to be shifting is in the 
case of NAVAl RSYSCOM, s Price Based Estimating Envisioning 
Laboratory discussed in Chapter IV. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Increase TINA Waiver guidance in policy documents 
residing at the Federal and DOD level while reducing 
excessively restrictive policies and procedures. Moreover, 
promote Service procurement commands to do the same at the 
local level. 
Instituting more guidance at these levels would provide 
benefit to the acquisition workforce in several ways. 
First, macro level guidance at the Federal and DOD level 
creates a uniform set of guidelines that can be commonly 
referenced by all. Second, increasing guidance can enhance 
the level of comfort PCOs have in requesting a waiver by 
providing tools to assist in making smart business 
decisions. Lastly, promoting guidance at the Service 
procurement command level would facilitate addressing 
considerations for the idiosyncrasies that pertain to unique 
purchases made at each command where a waiver might be used. 
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2. Reduce the level of oversight required to grant 
approval on a request for a TINA Waiver. 
Current acquisition reform stresses empowerment of the 
workforce. Maintaining waiver approval authority at current 
levels stifles a PCO's initiative to request a waiver and 
creates unnecessary adrninistrati ve burdens, defeating the 
intent of reform. Responsibility for the decision to 
approve a waiver can rest in the hands of those most 
directly responsible for making judgments similar in nature 
to that of a waiver. 
3. Implement policies that would facilitate obtaining 
waiver requests in procurements that demonstrate certain 
standard characteristics and attributes. 
All waiver cases examined, excluding two, demonstrated 
a standard set of attributes and characteristics that 
indicated suitability for a waiver. These procurement 
scenarios should be codified and granted approval for 
waivers with less stringent scrutiny by waiver authorities. 
Suggestions for this recommendation where also offered by 
members of NAVAIRSYSCOM who spoke to the use of "blanket" or 
"class " waivers. Approving waiver requests in this way 
would expedite the waiver request process by lessening 
oversight and improving potential savings. 
89 
4. In light of the lack of TINA Waiver guidance 
described in Conclusion 4 above, the researcher recommends 
that the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) 
consider the TINA Waiver questions presented in Table I, or 
derivations of such questions, for inclusion in the FAR to 
guide PCOs. 
Those interviewed for this thesis voiced a need for 
increased TINA Waiver guidance. The researcher believes 
based on the aspects of TINA Waivers examined, that the TINA 
Waiver questions offered in the current version of the DAD 
(Table 1) may assist those who are considering TINA Waivers. 
Although the DAD's list of guidance may not be 
comprehensive, it appears to offer a good starting point for 
generating formal, standard questions to be asked that could 
result in controlling the risks involved with waivers. 
Increasing the quantity of risk planning and analysis tools 
speci fic to waivers may impact waiver use by removing the 
reluctance of PCO's to make waiver decisions. 
D. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
As a result of the research conducted on TINA Waivers, 
the following areas warrant further research. 
1. Examine more specifically the concept of using 
price-based proposal preparation as a primary means of 
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conducting future procurements to assist the NAVAIRSYSCOM 
Price Based Estimating Envisioning Laboratory. 
2. Construct a formal decision model that can be used 
by PCOs for assessing the potential of a procurement for a 
TINA Waiver. 
3. Research and develop a standardized computer based 
parametric estimating model to be used in conjunction with 
TINA Waiver scenarios. 
4. Examine further procurement scenarios for potential 
TINA Waiver use. 
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APPENDIX A. NAVAIRSYSCOM SURVEY 
SURVEY QUESTIONAIRRE 
Guiding· Information. Please be unbiased in your answers. 
Any and all information that can be provided to each 
question will be of great assistance. Answers need not be 
limited in length; the more information that can be offered, 
the better. For sake of ease, survey answers kept in 
Microsoft Word format will facilitate transmittal and 
management of survey responses. Inquiries regarding survey 
questions and return of surveys can be sent to Captain 
Douglas Mrak at e-mail address(Dmrak@nps.navy.mil) . Phone 
contact of a like nature can be made to ########. Should 
any respondent wish to mail a survey response, they can be 
sent to the following address: 
Captain Douglas J. Mrak 
Naval Post Graduate School 
2 University Circle - SGC # 1869 
Monterey, CA 93940-1869 
1. Which program do you currently support? .In what capacity 
do you serve? How long have you been with this program? 
2. Does your program currently use, or has it previously 
used, a Truth in Negotiations Act Waiver during any portion 
of the program's lifetime? If so, how often are, or have, 
these waivers been used? 
3. In cases where waivers have been applied, please describe 
the procurement scenario that facilitated the use of the 
waiver. 
4. In light of question number three, what benefits can you 
associate with the use of these waivers? If these benefits 
provided quantifiable savings, please elaborate on the 
categories of savings and a specific quantity or range of 
savings. 
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5. Are TINA Waivers a regular part of the acquisition 
strategy for your program? If so, in what ways do you plan 
for the use of waivers throughout the acquisition cycle? 
6. If your program has not ever requested a waiver, can you 
please briefly explain why? 
7. What types of procurement scenarios do you see as being 
readily adaptable to the use of a TINA Waiver currently or, 
in the future? 
8. What changes in Department of Defense and Department of 
the Navy policy would you propose to make the use of waivers 
more pronounced? 
9. What actual risks have you faced or, do you see as being 
inherent to the use of a waiver? How do you feel these 
risks can be mitigated? If risk were identified in 
conjunction with the use of a waiver, how did your program 
address/mitigate these risks? 
10. What is your perception of the general acquisition 
workforce's feelings toward the use of TINA Waivers? How do 
you feel that your command hierarchy views the use of 
waivers? 
11. Have any waivers been requested for your program that 
have been disapproved by the Head of the Contracting 
Activity (HCAl? If yes, please elaborate on the 
circumstances underlying the cause of the disapproval. 
12. What is your opinion of the Government Contractor's 
receptiveness toward TINA Waivers? 
13. Have any Government Contractors that are associated 
with your program made recommendations for waivers that were 
successfully taken for action? 
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14. Have any waivers that have been used facilitated the 
"partnering" relationships between you and the Government 
Contractor. If so, in what ways? 
15. Do you have any other comments you would like to make, 




APPENDIX B. CONTRACTOR SURVEY 
Truth in Negotiations Act Waivers 
Survey Questionnaire 
Precursory Infor.mation: Under United states Code, Title 10 
(U.S.C 10), commonly known as the Truth in Negotiations Act 
of 1962, exceptions reside allowing the Government to grant 
a contractor exception to the requirement for requesting 
certified cost and pricing data for procurements exceeding 
$500,000. The fourth of four exceptions permits the use of 
a wai ver in exceptional procurement scenarios where 
sufficient cost history exists and price and price 
reasonableness can be determined without the need for 
certified cost data. These waivers are most often referred 
to as TINA Waivers. In relation to this exception, this 
survey is designed to determine your experience with and 
opinions of such waivers as they pertain to your conduct of 
business with the Government. All answers provided to this 
survey will be non-attributional. Please be as candid as is 
possible when providing your responses. The purpose of this 
survey is to determine objective recommendations for 
promoting the use of such waivers in the future should they 
be found to be beneficial. 
Questions: 
1. Has your organization encountered the use of a TINA 
Waiver, or waivers, while supporting any Government maj or 
systems programs? If so, could you offer the name of the 
program(s) and how often a waiver was granted? . 
2. In the face of Government Acquisition Reform, 
specifically, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 
1994, have you seen the Government contracting activities 
you do business with being more proactive towards the use of 
TINA Waivers? 
3. In cases where waivers have been applied, what benefits 
has your organization/department realized as a result of 
waiver use? How have these benefits enhanced your 
capabilities to perform the service/products you provide? 
97 
4. I f quanti fiable savings (i. e. time or cost) where 
associated with using a waiver, could you offer a range of 
savings that you realized? How have these savings 
facilitated the conduct of business with the Government? If 
these savings were not institutionalized, could your offer 
your opinion on the savings that were found? 
5. Does your company work actively with the Government on 
promoting the use of waivers where an obvious potential 
exists for their use? Have there been any cases in which 
your organization recommended using a waiver and the 
Government did not pursue the recommendation? If so, could 
you briefly describe the scenario? 
6. Understanding the need for the Government to be able to 
determine price reasonableness, what price or cost analysis 
tools or programs, if any, has you organization offered to 
facilitate the abilities of the Government in doing so? 
Have these tools or programs been actively used or sought by 
the Government? 
7. In general, what do you feel your company's overall 
opinion of TINA Waivers is? 
8. What Government related procurement scenarios within your 
organization do you feel offer a viable use of a TINA 
Waiver? How do you feel the Government can protect its 
interests in these scenarios regarding determination of 
price reasonableness? 
9. What commercial procurement practices does your company 
employ with other buyers that you feel could be easily 
adopted to Government procurements which would negate the 
need for certified cost and pricing data submittals? 
10. What additional comments or suggestions can you offer 
regarding waiving the requirement for certified cost and 
pricing data submission in Government procurements? 
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APPENDIX C. NAVAIRSYSCOM PPM #170 
AIR-2.0 POLICY & PROCEDURES MEMORANDUM # 170 
4200 
AIR-2.1.1.1 
28 May 98 
Subj: AUTHORITY TO WAIVE SUBMISSION OF CERTIFIED COST OR 
PRICING DATA, AND TO OBTAIN COST OR PRICING DATA FOR 
CONTRACTING ACTIONS BELOW REGULATORY THRESHOLDS 
Ref: (a) FAR 15.403 
Encl: (1) Sample Request for Waiver (without enclosures) 
(2) Endorsement Page 
(3) Sample Waiver 
(4) Sample Determination and Finding (D&F) to Obtain 
Cost or Pricing Data Below Regulatory Thresholds 
1. Purpose. This PPM provides guidance, in accordance with 
reference (a), for requesting a waiver from the Truth in 
Negotiations Act (TINA) requirement for submission of 
certified cost or pricing data. It also provides procedures 
f9r requesting authority to obtain certified cost or pricing 
data for acquisitions below regulatory thresholds but over 
the simplified acquisition threshold. 
2. Policy. For any action where another exception to the 
requirements of reference (a) does not apply, but the 
contracting officer is able to determine that the estimated 
cost or price is fair and reasonable without requiring the 
submission of certified cost or pricing data, a waiver in 
accordance with reference (a) shall be considered. In 
addi tion, certified cost or pricing data for acquisitions 
under regulatory thresholds but over the simplified 
acquisition threshold may not be obtained unless the Head of 
the Contracting Activity (HCA) justifies the requirement in 
accordance with reference (a). 
3. Procedures. 
a. Wai ver Criteria. The following general criteria 
should be applied in deciding the appropriateness of seeking 
a waiver: 
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Subj: AUTHORITY TO WAIVE SUBMISSION OF CERTIFIED COST OR 
PRICING DATA, AND TO OBTAIN COST OR PRICING DATA FOR 
CONTRACTING ACTIONS BELOW REGULATORY THRESHOLDS 
(1) AIR-2. a shall be notified, as early as is 
practical, in a procurement when use of a waiver is being 
contemplated. 
(2) Waivers shall be approved prior to reaching any 
agreements with contractors. 
(3) Waivers are justified only in those situations 
where adequate reliable information exists, with a 
particular focus on actual cost history, to determine a fair 
and reasonable price. System/equipment configuration should 
be reasonably stable to allow projection from actual 
verifiable costs, not negotiated numbers, from recently 
completed contractual efforts. 
(4) Contractors should have approved purchasing, 
estimating and accounting systems. Additionally, these 
systems should be reasonably free of minor deficiencies 
impacting the program in question. Finally, the 
contractor's business unit shall be reasonably free of 
defective pricing actions on the program seeking the 
waiver. 
(5) Contracting Officers should determine whether there 
are any ongoing program or pertinent corporate 
investigations and review their status to ensure complete 
reliability of data to be utilized in lieu of cost or 
pricing data. If there is any question, consult with 
counsel. 
(6) If proposed prices are greater than that for any 
prior contract for the same items, the basis of the 
increases must be clearly justifiable from data other than 
certified cost or pricing data. 
(7) Caution shall be exercised relative to consecutive 
waivers. Generally, a waiver every other acquisition is 
considered more prudent as it permits periodic review of 
certified data to validate the analysis used where a waiver 
was approved. However, two consecutive waivers may be 
appropriate if the contracting officer has solid insight 
into recent actual costs and trends. More than two 
consecutive waivers should normally not be requested unless 
unusual circumstances provide support for such an action. 
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Subj: AUTHORITY TO WAIVE SUBMISSION OF CERTIFIED COST OR 
PRICING DATA, AND TO OBTAIN COST OR PRICING DATA FOR 
CONTRACTING ACTIONS BELOW REGULATORY THRESHOLDS 
(8) Since many prime contractors are integrators, 
waivers for high-dollar subcontracts should also be 
considered if other data are deemed to provide an adequate 
basis for proj ecting a fair and reasonable price or cost. 
When a waiver is being processed for the prime contractor, 
in order to waive TINA requirements for subcontracts over 
regulatory thresholds, the waiver must specifically include 
those subcontractors. (If numerous, identify subcontractors 
to which the waiver applies on a waiver attachment) . 
(9) When deciding whether to seek a waiver of certified 
cost or pricing data for high dollar subcontractors, the 
same criteria as stated above should be considered. If it 
is considered inappropriate to waive certified cost or 
pricing data for high-
dollar subcontractors, such as in cases where high-dollar 
subcontractors have had pricing problems (i.e., cost growth, 
significant estimating system deficiencies, or numerous 
defective pricing instances), the waiver should be only for 
the prime contractor's effort. 
b. A proposed waiver shall be requested in a memo that 
details the basis for determining that the price is fair and 
reasonable. Supporting documents should be included only if 
necessary to illustrate a point. Enclosures (1), (2) and 
(3) provide examples of a request, an endorsement page, and 
a waiver. (Samples are illustrative only; the circumstances 
of each individual waiver request will be unique.) 
c. Authority to require certified cost or pricing data 
below regulatory thresholds will be obtained via a brief 
memo accompanied by a Determination and Findings (D&F) to be 
signed by AIR-OO. A sample D&F is provided as enclosure 
(4) • 
d. Both requests described in 3.b. and 3.c. above 
shall be routed for concurrence to the contracting officer 
(if prepared by the contract specialist), counsel, division 
head, department head, and will be signed by the Assistant 
Commander for Contracts or Deputy (AIR-2.0 or AIR-2.0A). In 
addition, requests under 3.b. above shall contain an 
endorsement page which also reflects the concurrence of AIR-
4.2 Cost Analysis Department and the cognizant program 
manager/program executive officer (see enclosure 2). 
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CONTRACTING ACTIONS BELOW REGULATORY THRESHOLDS 
NAWCAD/TSD and NAWCWD requests will be forwarded via AIR-2.5 
and AIR-2. 4 , respectively. After signature of the 
forwarding memorandum by AIR-2.0 or AIR-2.0A, all requests 
will be forwarded under cover of an Outgoing Mail Record 
form (NAVAIR Form 5216/13). Clearance ladder block on the 
Outgoing Mail Record form should include: AIR-2.0 or AIR-
2.0A, AIR-7.7, AIR-00EA2, AIR-OOEA, AIR-09, and, finally, 
AIR-OO for signature. 
/s/ R. E. COWLEY 
Distribution: 




DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND 
47123 BUSE ROAD, UNIT #IPT 
PATUXENT RIVER, MD 20670-1547 










Assistant Commander for Contracts (AIR-2.0) 
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (AIR-OO) 
REQUEST TO WAIVE REQUIREMENT FOR SUBMISSION OF 
CONTRACTOR CERTIFIED COST OR PRICING DATA FOR THE FY 
97,LOT 20 PROCUREMENT OF CH-53E HELICOPTERS 
(a) FAR 15-403-1(b) 
Encl: (1) Negotiated Unit Prices FY 92 through FY 96 
(2) Cumulative Average Theory Applied to Material 
(3) FY 94 (Lot 17) Actuals 
(4) DCMC Sikorsky Approval Letter of Waiver 
(5) Waiver from Submission of Contractor Certified 
Cost or Pricing Data 
1. Reference (a), which implements 10 U.S.C.2306a(b) (1) (B), 
provides that the head of the contracting activity may waive 
the requirement for submission of contractor certified cost 
or pricing data under exceptional circumstances. The 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 encourages a 
broad definition of "exceptional circumstances," including a 
situation where Certified Cost and Pricing data furnished 
under previous production buys, used in conjunction with 
updated information, is sufficient to determine fair and 
reasonable prices. 
2. The FY 97 (Lot 20) procurement of CH-53E helicopters is 
an excellent candidate for a waiver of cost and pricing 
data. The CH-53E helicopter is a shipboard compatible, 
heavy lift, transport helicopter. The CH-53E has been in 
production since 1978 with 174 aircraft delivered to date. 
Thus there is extensive cost history on the program for 
determining fair and reasonable prices. 
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3. Due to funding uncertainties, the program office was 
unable to initiate procurement action for the FY 97 
helicopter requirement until now. Waiting for the 
contractor to prepare a full cost proposal for two 
additional helicopters and performing the necessary 
audits/cost analysis will exacerbate the delay. 
4. Sikorsky submitted a proposal dated 28 February 1997 for 
the FY 97 (Lot 20) production buy of two CH-53E helicopters 
with a unit price of $22,750,000. This proposed unit price 
represents a less than four percent increase over the FY 96 
(Lot 19) unit price. The contractor developed the unit 
price based on historical data from FY 94 (Lot17) and price 
analysis using the "PRICE Hardware Model." The negotiated 
settlement price for FY 94 (Lot 17) production buy was fully 
audited by DPRO/DCAA and supported by certified cost and 
pricing data. FY 95 and FY 96 (Lots 18 and 19) were both 
negotiated using price analysis based on FY 93 and FY 94 
(Lots 16 and 17) and were supported by Certificates of 
Current Cost and Pricing. Having had nineteen earlier 
production lot buys, Sikorsky's learning curve has now 
leveled off and a proposed increase of less than four 
percent over the previous fiscal year is seen as extremely 
favorable and reasonable. 
5. The proposed Lot 20 price was examined from two 
different perspectives. The first analysis was based on 
pure price analysis using past lot prices. Using the 
negotiated FY 92 (Lot 15) through FY 96 (Lot 19), and FY 97 
(Lot 20) proposed unit prices, AIR 4.2 indices were used to 
convert them to 1998 dollars and a comparison of these 
prices is shown in enclosure (1). Using only this 
superficial comparison, the total proposed price for two 
helicopters still equates to a less than one percent 
increase over the FY 96 buy (escalated to constant FY 98 
dollars) . 
6. Enclosure (2) shows the effects of the significant 
change in quantity of aircraft to the material dollars. A 
reduction from twelve aircraft to two aircraft increased the 
material dollars by over one million constant FY 98 dollars. 
7. In addition to price analysis, the proposed price was 
further substantiated by looking at FY 94 (Lot 17) audited 
actuals and applying appropriate adjustments to certain cost 
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elements. Enclosure (3) shows the escalation of the FY 94 
actuals to constant FY 98 dollars with current overheads and 
the application of a fixed percentage for sustaining 
enginee~ing. 
8. When examining the analysis it is important to note 
that the FY 94 (Lot 17) original proposal and audit were 
based on a requirement for sixteen aircraft, however the 
Navy reduced the requirement to only twelve aircraft, and an 
advanced acquisition contract was signed in April 1993. 
Despite the substantial reduction in the requirement, the 
contractor agreed to enter into negotiations based on this 
original proposal. On May 6, 1994 a negotiated 
definitization settlement of $19,639,919 per unit was 
achieved for each of the twelve aircraft in Lot 17. 
9. Less than 6 months later the FY 95 (Lot 18) per unit 
'price of $19,900,000 for two aircraft was agreed to. The 
negotiation for the two additional FY 95 aircraft was 
supported under the umbrella of the FY 94 (Lot 17) original 
proposal and audit. Due to the short period of time elapsed 
since the FY 94 buy, the contractor was able to achieve some 
economy by exercising vendor options under Lot 17 and by 
adding the two additional aircraft to the end of. Lot 17 
production run. 
10. The FY 96 (Lot 19) two aircraft lot had a negotiated 
price of $21,900,000 per aircraft. The Lot 17 proposal and 
audit were again used as a basis for the negotiation along 
with DRI escalated actuals from completed Lot 16 aircraft. 
The contractor re-certified his Lot 17 proposal along with 
the additional actuals and other data provided in support 
of the negotiation. The more substantial increase in price 
for Lot 19 was found to be a result of the substantial drop 
in aircraft- quantity (from fourteen to two) and from the 
longer production stretch-out (approximately six months) . 
The contractor was unable to tack the production of the two 
additional aircraft onto the end of the Lot 17/18 production 
runs. Therefore, he was unable to achieve any significant 
quantity savings on material purchases. 
11. The FY 97 (Lot 20) buy will be similar to Lot 19 in 
that it will be for only two aircraft and it will be 
essentially a "stand-alone" run with some inevitable break 
or pause in production. Despite this fact, in light of the 
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long cost and pricing history on this program we believe 
there is sufficient data to arrive at a reasonable price. 
Waiving the submission of the certified cost or pricing data 
for modification to CH-53E contract N00019-93-C-0053 will 
significantly reduce administrative costs associated with 
proposal preparation and the negotiation process for the 
Government, as well as the contractor. 
11. It should be noted that this request for a waiver is 
not based on a refusal of the contractor to provide 
certified cost or pricing data. The resident DCMC office 
has provided enclosure (4), a signed letter acknowledging 
their review and approval of the subject waiver. 
13. Based upon the above analysis, the price can be 
determined to be fair and reasonable without submission of 
certified cost or pricing data. Therefore, waiver from 
submission of certified cost or pricing data for this 
procurement makes good business sense. Your approval 
signature is requested on the waiver provided as enclosure 
(5). Pricing for future CH-53E procurements will be 
reviewed on a case by case basis and the need for cost and 
pricing data assessed. 
14. If there are any questions or concerns, please contact 
(type name of cognizant PCO) at (type telephone number), or 
the undersigned. 
(signed by AIR-2.0 or 2.0A) 
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I have reviewed this waiver in addition to the attached 
justification relating to the FY97 CH-53E helicopter and believe 
an adequate basis exists for determining a fair and reasonable 
price without requiring the submission of certified cost or 
pricing data from the contractor. 
CONTRACTING OFFICER: 
(Typed name of PCO) 
Date 
LEGAL REVIEW: 
(Typed name of legal counsel) 
Date 
AIR-4.2 COST ANALYSIS DEPARTMENT: 
(Typed name of AIR-4.2 reviewer) 
Date 
HEAD, (TYPED NAME OF 2.0 DEPARTMENT) : 






PROGRAM MANAGER, (TYPED NAME OF PROGRAM) : 








PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER, (TYPED NAME OF PEO ORGANIZATION) : 





DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
Authority to Waive Submission of 
Certified Cost or Pricing Data 
1. The Naval Air Systems Command proposes to award a firm 
fixed price modification to contract N00019-93-C-0053 for 











2. Under FAR 15-403-4 (a) (1) and 15.406-2, Sikorsky Aircraft 
Corporation is required to submit certified cost and pricing 
data prior to award of a contract for the items listed in 
paragraph 1. above. However, I am waiving the certification 
requirements for the following reasons: 
(a) Extensive historical cost and pricing data exist upon 
which reasonable prices can be established, 
(b) The end item is in mature production, and 
(c) Significant administrative costs and time will be 
saved by the Government and the Contractor. 
3. I hereby make this waiver under the authority of 10 
U.S.C. 2306a(b) (1) (B), as implemented by FAR 15.403-1 (c) (4). 
(Typed name of AIR-DO) 
COMMANDER 




NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND 
NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND HEADQUARTERS 
47123 BUSE ROAD, UNIT # IPT 
PATUXENT RIVER, MD 20670-1547 
DETERMINATION AND FINDINGS 
Authority to Require Cost or Pricing Data 
Under $500,000 
Upon the basis of the following findings, pursuant to the 
authority of Title 10 U.S.C. Section 2306a. (c) (1), as 
implemented in FAR 15.403-4(a) (2), it is hereby determined 
that cost or pricing data under the $500,000 threshold may 
be required for the proposed contract action. 
FINDINGS 
I. The Naval Air Systems Command proposes to award a 
(insert contract type) contract for the FYXX procurement of 
(insert description of requirement) at an estimated amount 
of $ (insert estimate) . 
2. Certified cost or pricing data are necessary to determine 
whether the price is fair and reasonable because (MUST state 
reasons why contractor certified cost or pricing data are 
necessary for NAVAIR to evaluate the reasonableness of the 
proposed price) . 
DETERMINATION 
Based on the foregoing, cost or pricing data are required 
under the proposed contract action in order to determine the 
price is fair and reasonable. 
(Typed name of AIR-GO) 
DATE 
COMMANDER 
NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND 
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